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PSYCHIC INTEREST IN CONTINUATION OF ONE'S OWN
LIFE: LEGAL RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION
(Spectrum of Personality Interests Legally Protectible in Tort
Actions for Personal Injury)
By HUBERT WINSTON SMITH t
INTRODUCTION
May the victim of personal injuries wrongfully inflicted recover
damages for consequent shortening of his life expectancy? The an-
swer to this novel problem ought to turn on how far the law should
go in protecting psychic aspects of the human personality against
culpable invasions which are not simply disturbing but demonstrably
destructive.1 One should like to plunge straightway into logic and
social policy as the proper determinants of this question, remembering
that for sixty years legal protection of the psyche has been steadily
expanding.'
But however much one might prefer to treat this matter as a
problem sui gener'is, he is balked by an involved and clinging history
which invests the subject and obscures it. He is freshly reminded that
the chronology of concepts has unusual importance in the life of the
law because of the peculiar risk that stare decisis may enshrine an
error implicit in the initial step of doctrinal evolution and thus retard
tResearch Professor of Law and Medicine, and Director of the Law-Science Insti-
tute, Tulane University. The author has a pleasurable debt of gratitude to Mr. Walter
Fred Gemeinhardt and to Miss Carmen Martinez, research students in his course on
"Elements of Medicolegal Litigation," the Tulane Law School, for yeoman help given
him in preparing the final draft of this paper.
1. Transient disturbance of psychic tranquillity (fear, pain, mental anguish)
lessens the pleasure of existence, but may be neutralized, or alleviated or shrugged
off or eventually escaped; the shortening of life through injury involves an amputation
of life substance and so an absolute and irremediable loss.
2. See Pound, Interests of Personcaity, 28 HAv. L. REv. 343, 445 (1915) ; STONE,
TErE PRovINcE AND FuxCrON or LAW, Ch. XXI: Individual Interests or Conditions
of Individual Life in Society (1946) ; Smith, Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli,
30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944); Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30
VA. L. REv. 87 (1943).
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or defeat correction of the mistake through continuing growth and
mutation of ideas. The subject for discussion is encumbered by doc-
trines of dubious policy, of exceedingly doubtful lineage, which be-
came sovereign principles of the common law through the familiar
process of prolonged passive acceptance. Now the fact is that serious
doubt exists as to whether these doctrines have any true bearing upon
the recognition of a legally protectible interest in the continuation of
one's own life despite a current tendency to assume their relevancy.
So great has been the obscurity in this connection that a sociological
approach to our subject must await rescue of the problem from the
distorting impacts of history misapplied.
IRRELEVANCE OF THE COMmoN-LAw RULES CONCERNING THE JURAL
EFFECTS OF DEATH
Few of our American courts have passed upon the right of a per-
son injured by the wrongful act of another to recover damages for
resultant shortening of his life expectancy and nowhere in our juris-
prudence can a decision be found which probes the problem in a
penetrating or rounded manner. It is fashionable to say that no Amer-
ican court has allowed damages for shortening of life expectancy, but
this is far from accurate. The truth is that a majority of the courts
which have dealt at all with the problem have granted damages to the
injured plaintiff for loss of earning capacity during the part of his life
expectancy destroyed by the defendant's wrong.' These decisions con-
tain little or no philosophic discussion. Nowhere will one find the in-
terest of personality in continuation of human life properly dissected
into its essential components, namely: the economic expectancy, based
upon the individual's prospect of earning money, and the psychic ex-
pectancy based upon his anticipation of a life worth living. The result
is that the prevailing practice in American law is to compensate only
the economic loss which a man sustains when his life is shortened by
the defendant's tort, without explicit mention of the psychic interest
concurrently affected.
Those American decisions which deny all damages for shortening
of life expectancy rest principalfy on the specious assumption that since
the death of a human being could not be complained of as a legal wrong
in a civil action at common law, the shortening of life of a living
3. This is always true in theory, but in practice much depends upon whether there
is a co-existing wrongful 'death act and next of kin eligible to claim under it. See
note 52 infra.
Damages for decreased earning power are based upon plaintiff's life expectancy
before the injury; damages for future suffering are based on his life expectancy at the
time of the trial. Webb v. Omaha & S.I.R. Co., 101 Neb. 596, 164 NAy. 564 (1917).
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person is not an actionable injury. For example in Richmond Gas Co.
v. Baker,4 an 85 year old woman recovered a verdict of $4,500 for
severe injuries which resulted from an explosion caused by defendant's
negligent mending of a leaking pipe on the consumer's premises. The
trial judge instructed the jury that in estimating damages they might
consider whether or not plaintiff's life expectancy had been shortened
by her injuries received in the explosion. This was held on appeal
to be reversible error. The precedents cited by appellant were all cases
resting upon the authority of Baker v. Bolton,5 the 1808 Nisi Prius
decision in England in which Lord Ellenborough uttered his oft-quoted
dictum that "In a civil court the death of a human being could not be
complained of as an injury." The court accepted these precedents as
controlling, declaring that:
. . . if the condition of the injured person is such that
a shortening of life may be apprehended, this may be considered
in determining the extent of the injury, the consequent disability
to make a living and the bodily and mental suffering which will
result. This, however, falls far short of authorizing damages for
the loss or shortening of life itself. The value of human life can-
not, as adjudged by the common law, be measured in money. It
is, besides, inconceivable that one could thus be compensated for
the loss or shortening of his own life.6
The fundamental fallacy here is in appellant's contention, accepted by
the court, that "the common law does not admit of compensation in
money for the taking of human life or the shortening of its dura-
tion. . . ." The first half of the proposition is a true statement of
an anomaly of the common law far more ancient than Lord Ellen-
borough's decision of Baker v. Bolton in 1808; however, it should be
stressed that no case at common law can be found foreclosing the right
of a living person to recover damages for wrongful shortening of his
life expectancy. None of the precedents cited and relied upon con-
tains any such holding, all being actions based upon the death of one
wrongfully injured. Death at common law, either of victim or of
tort-feasor, snuffs out the cause of action for personal injuries for
ancient reasons now somewhat obscure, but certainly not because of
any rule of policy of the law of damages applicable to an action by a
living plaintiff against a living defendant as was involved in Rich-
nond Gas Co. v. Baker. Observe, also, the court's statement that
"The value of human life cannot, as adjudged by the common law,
4. 146 Ind. 600, 45 N.E. 1049 (1897).
5. 1 Camp. 493 (1808).
6. Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 146 Ind. 600, 609, 45 N.E. 1049, 1052 (1897).
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be measured in money." Now the fact is that no one seriously con-
tends that this was the original foundation of the common law rules
which prevented the maintenance of a civil action for wrongful death.
The court in Hyatt v. Adams I proposed this admittedly new justi-
fication for the common law rules, thinking it more cogent than the
historical grounds traditionally assigned in their support, but it has
not been accorded any real acceptance. We may fairly say that the
opinion in Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker is erroneous in its historical
premises, that its conclusions are not supported by legal precedent
and that no convincing reasons are set forth for the court's solution
of a problem whose novelty eluded judicial detection." Other Ameri-
can cases which refuse to permit a living person to recover damages
for shortening of his life expectancy by personal injury assume that
such a result is compelled by the common law rules preventing a
civil action for wrongful death.' The error of this cardinal assump-
tion can be demonstrated both by history and by logic. To appreciate
the legal effect which death has at common law upon tort claims for
personal injury, one must understand that two separate fact situa-
tions may be involved.
Rule A. A wrongfully injures B but before a judgment for dam-
ages can be had, the victim B, or the tort-feasor A, dies. In either case,
at common law the effect of death is to extinguish the cause of action.
It does not survive in favor of or against the dead man's estate, but, as
the saying goes, is buried with the decedent. A pending action for
damages abates with the death and cannot be afterwards revived. This
rule is customarily identified with the maxim "Actio personalis moritur
cum persona," an ancient brocard first used judicially in the time of
the Year Books."
7. 16 Mich. 179 (1867).
8. It is important to note that the English courts had expressly distinguished
Baker v. Bolton (the basis of the decision in Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker) and held
it inapplicable to a complaint of shortening of life by wrongful injury asserted by the
victim himself, as a living plaintiff, in an action against a living defendant. Fair v.
London & N.W. Ry. Co., 21 L.T. 326 (1869) ; Phillips v. London & S.W. Ry. Co.,
5 Q.B.D. 78 (1879). These decisions antedated the Richmond case and should have
controlled its reasoning. Unfortunately, the American Court seems to have been
unaware both of this further development in the English law, limiting the effect of
Baker v. Bolton, and of the vital distinction which rendered that decision inapplicable
to living litigants such as were involved in the Richmond Gas Co. case.
9. Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940); Krakowski v. Aurora
E. & C.R. Co., 167 Ill. App. 469 (1912); Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. Johnson, 191
Ind. 479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922) ; Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, supra note 6; Choicener
v. Walters Amusement Agency, 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929) ; Ham v. Maine-
N.H. Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1 (1943).
10. PoLLocic, TnE LAW OF TORTS, 62 et seq. (13th ed. 1929) ; Y.B. Mich. 18 Edw.
IV, f. 15, pl. 17 (1417), cited by Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29
COL. L. Rv. 239, 244 (1929). And see Y.B. Hen. VI 66, p1l. 10 (1440-41), dictum
of Newton, C.J., that: "If one doth a trespass to me, and dieth, the action is dead
also, because it should be inconvenient to recover against one who was not a party
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Rule B. A wrongfully injures W, the wife of H, and after lan-
guishing in bed for a time, W dies of her injuries. H now sues A for
damages for loss of his wife's services. Observe that both plaintiff and
defendant are still alive and that the husband seeks to recover damages
for an injury to his interests occasioned by the wife's death but not to
succeed to the rights of action she had while still alive. In such a case
it is plausible to argue that the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum
persona" need not apply as it is concerned with intransmissibility of
tort claims where victim or wrongdoer has died.
Situation B was the factual situation in Baker v. Bolton. Lord
Ellenborough held that the husband could recover damages for medical
expense and loss of the wife's services up to the time of her death
but no more. Without hearing argument of counsel, without explana-
tion of his reasons, and without reference to any precedent, Lord
Ellenborough declared: "In a civil court the death of a human being
could not be complained of as an injury; and in this case the dam-
ages as to the plaintiff's wife must stop with the period of her ex-
istence." He did not allude to the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona. Partially because Lord Ellenborough was a learned
man, his dictum concerning the jural effects of death upon claims for
personal injury has received the lion's share of attention by courts
and legal writers. If the reader seeks to discover the origin of either
of these rules by tracing their genealogy, he will reach no certain
answer, as none exists in the annals of our law. He must find his
solace in the fact that every investigator has come to the same im-
passe. One can only reach certain speculative possibilities none of
which has any degree of certainty; " and in the end one is prone to
accept the intimation of the House of Lords that the rules express an
historical anomaly rather than any product of scientific jurispru-
to the wrong." The maxim is the latinized expression of a doctrine which originated
still earlier. Goudy, Two Ancient Brocards, in VIIAGRADoFF, ESSAYS IN LEGAL
HIsToRY 215 (1913), and 3 HoLDSWo1TH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 576 (3d ed.
1923).
11. It has been suggested that the rules stem from Bracton's misunderstanding
of the Roman Law; GOUDY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 219 et seq.; contra, WINFIELD,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 244. They have also been interpreted as corollaries of the
Common Law's inability to transfer causes of action from one person to another;
Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and- Survival Statutes, 23 MIcH. L.
REv. 114 (1925) ; and of the merger of the private cause of action with the Crown's
prosecution for homicide; 3 HoLwswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 10, at 331; see also
TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr 16 (2d ed. 1913), and, for American appli-
cations, Boardman v. Gore, 15 Mass. 330 (1819), and Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90
(Conn. 1794). Paralleling the latter possibility, it has been pointed out that tres-
pass would not lie for a felony (a procedural deficiency) ; Admiralty Com'rs v. S.S.
Amerika, [1917] A.C. 38; but see criticism of the court's historical material in 3
HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. spra, at 576. There is no historical basis for supposing that
the rules were founded on the Roman Law maxim that an injury to a freeman which
caused his death gave no right of action for the reason that no money value could be put
on the life of a freeman; GouDy, op. cit. supra, at 219 et seq.; WiNFIELD, op. cit.
supra, at 244; 3 HoLuswoRTH, op. cit. supra, at 331-336, 576, 676.
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dence.' 2 But clear it is that the rules trace back to medieval times,
to reasons now conjectural, to justifications long since vanished. They
lead to the surprising result that it was cheaper to murder than to
maim: one who wrongfully injured his victim could be made to pay
damages but he could escape all civil liability by taking pains to inflict
mortal injuries.' Courts have denounced the rules as harsh and
unjust; '" law writers have called them barbaric. 5 As fatal accidents
due to negligence began to mount with the advent of the railroad in
the early nineteenth century, social pressure forced legislative altera-
tions.' 6 In England and in most of our American states wrongful
death acts and survival statutes have been passed to limit or abolish
the rules."' This one can say with assurance: the anomalous common
law rules concerning the jural effects of death are not logically relevant
to the question whether or not a person should be conceded to have a
legally protectible interest in the continuation of his own life. The
rules were never applied at common law to defeat an action or to cur-
tail damages where the victim of a tort and the wrongdoer were both
alive at the time of trial and they should not be given any such effect
today. Furthermore, rules so thoroughly doubted and discredited
12. Admiralty Com'rs. v. S.S. Amerika, [1917] A.C. 38.
13. Thus Pollock observes (op. cit. supra note 10, at 64): "Railroad accidents,
towards the middle of the nineteenth century, brought the hardship of the common
law rule into prominence. A man who was maimed or reduced to imbecility by the
negligence of a railway company's servants might recover heavy damages. If he
died of his injuries, or was killed on the spot, his family might be ruined, but there
was no remedy. This state of things brought about the passing of Lord Campbell's
Act (9 and 10 Vict. c. 93, A.C. 1846), a statute extremely characteristic of English
legislation. Instead of abolishing the barbarous rule which was the root of the
mischief complained of, it created a new and anomalous kind of right and remedy
by way of exception." And see the opinion of Lord Wright in Rose v. Ford, [1937]
A.C. 826, 3 All E.R. 359. Even in early times, community sentiment was not opposed
to redressing wrongful death by monetary amends, as will be seen from the ancient
institution of wergild and the long tolerated use of the appeal of murder by the dead
man's relatives to force monetary compensation from the accused.
14. Hooper v. Gorham, 45 Me. 209 (1858) ; Harris v. Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573,
162 S.W. 584 (1914).
15. See authorities cited note 10 srupra.
16. Unfortunately, the greater readiness to protect property rights than to vindi-
cate interests of personality led to a grudging piece-meal reform rather than to aboli-
tion of the rules concerning effects of death upon tort claims. Only a part of the
victim's original cause of action was preserved to his dependents as "pecuniary loss"
under the terms of Lord Campbell's Act (9 and 10 Vicr., c. 93 (1846). This much
criticized and abortive legislation now known as the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and
1908, was widely copied by our American states.
17. In 1931, twenty-two states had separate survival statutes as well as wrong-
ful death acts and to this number were added Georgia (1935), New York (1935)
and Connecticut (1937). "Unfortunately, however, it appears at the outset that by
judicial decision about one-third of these jurisdictions do not permit actions to be
brought under both statutes for the same act or omission." 44 HARV. L. REv. 980
(1931).
For an excellent earlier article, see Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statu-
tory Revival of Tort Clains For and Against Executors and Administrators, 29
MicH. L. REV. 969 (1931). One of the leading articles of recent years is Oppenheim,
The Survival of Tort Actions and The Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey and
a Proposal, 16 TUL. L. REv. 386 (1942).
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should be narrowly confined to their historical applications rather than
extended. They should certainly not be treated as policy considera-
tions in the weighing of new interests when they express no acceptable
policy in their own right and province.
Survival statutes abolish Rule A. Nor is the legal situation altered
by the fact that the victim's life is snuffed out by an injury which
causes loss of life within minutes or seconds, or even instantly. Fur-
thermore the compensation allowed is for the injury, not for death.
The notion which some hold ' that a claim for shortening of life
expectancy is actually one for wrongful death is false, as a little re-
flection will show. It is settled in our law of damages that a victim's
cause of action in tort is for the full injury, including both immediate
consequences and those reasonably certain to occur in the future.-'
The victim does not gain a new cause of action as each fresh conse-
quence develops, for that would entail no end of litigation; he has a
single cause of action which vests in him at the moment the wrong is
committed. 20 Whatever happens thereafter is mere evidence which
measures the extent of the original wrong. If the victim is alive at
the time of trial, the extent, if any, to which his life has been shortened
by the injury involves a statement of probability based upon medical
opinion: if the victim dies before trial the probability is converted
into a conclusive certainty. The victim's cause of action cannot be
in respect of his wrongful death, for the law of nature would prevent its
accrual during his lifetime; his cause of action is for personal injury
and such prospective consequences as are reasonably certain to occur
in the future. Furthermore, virtually all courts hold that the cause
of action of one injured by wrongful conduct includes his prospective
loss of earning capacity for the full period of his life expectancy as it
existed before the accident. 21  In case of one fatally injured, these
damages are awarded to his administrator in respect to the cause of
action which the victim acquired in his own right as a living person
at the instant of the wrong, and do not depend on the theory of a
wrongful death action. 2  In brief, all of a man's interests of person-
ality may be injured instantly by the wrongful act of another; further-
more, a right of action for full consequential damages always vests in
the living victim during the time interval, however short, which
18. As, for instance, the courts which decided the cases cited in note 9 ,tpra.
19. Barron v. Duke, 120 Or. 181, 250 Pac. 628 (1926). 25 C.J.S. Damages 497,§ 31.20. Fitter v. Veal, 12 Mod. 542 (K.B. 1701) ; Brunsden v. Humphreys, 14 Q.B.D.
141 (1884).
21. Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1937); 25 C.J.S. Damages
512, § 40.
22. E. g., Measure of Damages for Death in Action for Benefit of Decedent's-
Estate, 7 A.L.R. 1314 (1920); 26 A.L.R. 593 (1923); 163 A.L.R. 247 (1946).
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separates the wrongful impact and its physiological consequences.
This means that the common-law rules as to the jural effects of death
are foreign to the problem of whether a living person suffers any legal
injury when his life expectancy is shortened, or even instantly termi-
nated by the defendant's wrongful conduct.3 That question may now
be discussed without false historical impediments.
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO NORMAL LIFE EXPECTANCY
Philosophic Basis of the Interest.-One's rights in respect to the
preservation and exercise of his physical and psychic faculties
are referable to interests of personality. The legal protection granted
to such interests does not depend upon any assumed violation of a
property right in one's own body. As Lord Atkin said for the House
of Lords in the English case of Rose v. Ford: 24
It does not seem to me necessary to say that a man has a
personal right, of the nature of property, in his life, so that, when
it is diminished, he loses something in the nature of valuable
property. I do not say that this is not so, but I am satisfied
that the injured person is damnified by having cut short the
period during which he had a normal expectation of enjoying
life, and that the loss, damnum, is capable of being estimated
in terms of money, and that the calculation should be made.
Injuria in tort results from any wrongful invasion of a legally
protected interest of personality.25 It would be unworthy of law or
logic to hold that an individual may have redress in damages for in-
terferences which obstruct or preclude the legal expression of person-
ality but shall be without remedy for injuries which impair or cut it
short. That every man has a redressible interest in the integrity of
his personality is attested daily by judgments of our courts allowing
damages for personal injuries culpably caused. That the shortening
of a man's life by so injuring him involves a distinct and separate
head of damage should be as readily perceptible if one will pause to
23. As Lord Roche said in Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 3 All. E.R. 359:
. it is theoretically wrong, in such a case, to start from death as shortening
life, but right to start with the initial bodily injuries carrying with them from the
outset a diminished expectation of life, which sooner or later will end with death.
On this analysis of the cause of action of the deceased, and of the plaintiff, I am im-
pelled to the conclusion that this cause of action is not within, and is not touched
by, the rule of law laid down in Baker v. Bolton and the Amerika case..... The
cause of action is the cause of action, not of a stranger to the deceased, but of the
deceased herself, when alive. . . . the deceased's death added nothing to the cause
of action, but was merely evidence of the gravity of the injuries, and of the extent
to which her expectation of life was diminished owing to such injuries."
24. [1937] A.C. 826, 3 All E.R. 359.
25. One must not forget that interests of personality are not created by the
law; they come into being and exist independently but an important incident in their
social acceptance is recognition by the law and protection against wrongful invasion.
See Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 445 (1915).
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analyze the matter. All one can hope for, or have, in respect to in-
terests of personality, is the right to possess and use his physical and
mental faculties as best he can and with what enjoyment he may derive
therefrom, during the span of his own life expectancy. Viewed in this
light, one's interests of personality are both qualitative and quantita-
tive: it is the continuation of life in its temporal aspect which gives
meaning and consequence to personality since every act or experience
requires its allotted time. An injury which cuts life short involves
an amputation of all interests of personality. Surely the victim suffers
as real a loss in such a case as another sustains from a crippling injury
which narrows, without shortening, the free expression of his per-
sonality. To assess the dimensions of interests of personality we are
bound by common sense to multiply the breadth of life by its length.
The ends of legal evolution seem to require protection of the
human personality both in its economic and psychic phases and as
to prospective as well as to present results of tortious injuries. This
may be attained by conceding to every individual a legal interest in
living his life without having it shortened by the wrongful act of an-
other. The law of damages in respect to personal injuries cannot at-
tain rational maturity if impairment of the victim's enjoyment of life by
wrongful act is not compensated independently of any pecuniary loss
suffered. Social considerations, also, argue for legal protection of life
expectancy against wrongful curtailment. Virtually every individual
has obligations or reasonably founded expectations which depend for
their fulfillment on his continued life. Damages should be granted
for shortening of life expectancy as one means of minimizing the frus-
tration of such expectations and the social dislocations caused by the
hastening of death.26 Finally, since a person's interests of personality
have a temporal dimension in nature, they should have as broad a
connotation and protection in law.
26. Awards to dependents under Wrongful Death Statutes are usually exempt
from the claims of creditors. Damages awarded for non-economic injuries to decedent
would not be a part of "the pecuniary loss" recoverable by dependents but would pass
to decedent's administrator under a general Survival statute and so be available for
payment of debts. As Pollock says: "But when once the notion of vengeance has
been put aside, and that of compensation substituted, the rule actio personalis mnoritur
curn persona seems to be without plausible ground. First, as to the liability, it is
impossible to see why a wrongdoer's estate should ever be exempted from making
satisfaction for his wrongs. It is better that the residuary legatee should be to some
extent cut short than that the person wronged should be deprived of redress. The
legatee can in any case take only what prior claims leave him, and there will be no
hardship in his taking subject to all obligations, ex delicto as well as ez contractu,
to which his testator was liable. Still less could reversal of the rule be a just cause
of complaint in the case of intestate succession. Then as to the right: it is supposed
that personal injuries cause no damage to a man's estate, and therefore after his death
the wrongdoer has nothing to account for. But this is oftentimes not so in fact.
And, in any case, why should the law, contrary to its own principles and maxims
in other departments, presume it, in favour of the wrongdoer, so to be?" POLuoc,
THE LAW OF TORTS 63 et seq. (13th ed. 1929).
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Historical antecedents. That hastening a person's death is an
injury to his rights of personality is sometimes described as a novel
doctrine originating with the English case of Flint v. Lovell1 7 in 1935.
The Court of Appeal there approved an award of damages to a 70 year
old man for serious injuries negligently caused by defendant. These
resulted in continued pain and suffering and reduced plaintiff's expec-
tation of life from eight or nine years as a hale and hearty, happy per-
son to less than a year's existence as a helpless invalid. The award
expressly included compensation for this loss of life expectancy. But
influential as Flint v. Lovell has been, it had legal precursors. One of
the most interesting is an early American case, Murphy v. New York
and New Haven R. R. Co. 8 decided by the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut in 1861. There the plaintiff, as administrator under a general
survival statute, brought'an action on the case alleging that defendant's
locomotive was negligently run "upon and against" the deceased and
that thereby deceased (a six year old child) was killed. From a judg-
ment in plaintiff's favor, the defendant appealed, contending that no
cause of action was set forth in the plaintiff's declaration, as case lies
only for consequential injury and decedent was killed presumably in-
stantly. The court, in affirming the judgment, held that it is an injury
to a person to hasten his death, saying:
• it is alleged in the declaration that the blow was so violent
as to produce the death of the intestate. And is this no injury?
If to take one's liberty or one's property without justification is
an injury, how much more is the taking of human life: The ele-
mentary books, in speaking of absolute rights, classify them thus:
-lst. The right of personal security; 2d. The right of personal
liberty; and 3d. The right to acquire and enjoy property. If these
rights are valued in this order of preference, then every man of
common understanding would at once pronounce it absurd to hold
that it is no injury to a person to take his life, while it is to strike
him a light blow. Such a distinction is not worth talking about,
and has no foundation or existence in the law, as it has none in
common sense.
2 9
In Phillips v. London & S. W. R. Co.,"0 a physician in the prime
of life, accustomed to earning from £6,000 to £7,000 per year from his
practice, was totally and permanently disabled by injuries received
when the train on which he was travelling negligently collided with a
light engine on the same track. In an action for damages, the trial
27. [1935] 1 K.B. 354 (C.A.).
28. 30 Conn. 184 (1861).
29. This is one of the clearest judicial affirmations we have found concerning
the interest of personality in living out one's life expectancy without wrongful
shortening.
30. 5 Q.B.D. 78 (C.A. 1879).
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judge told the jury that: "An active, energetic healthy man is not to be
struck down almost in the prime of life and reduced to a powerless
helplessness with every enjoyment of life destroyed and with the pros-
pect of a speedy death, without the jury being entitled to take that into
account, not excessively, not immoderately, not vindictively, but with
the view of giving him a fair compensation for the pain, inconvenience
and loss of enjoyment which he has sustained." The jury brought in
a verdict for plaintiff for £7,000. The Queen's Bench Division granted
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground that the amount of
damages given by the jury was so small as to show that they must
have left out of consideration some of the circumstances which ought
to have been taken into account. The defendants appealed. In up-
holding the order for a new trial, the Court of Appeal expressed the
opinion, in effect, that the trial court's charge relative to loss of earn-
ings should have been based on plaintiff's life expectancy prior to the
accident,"' but no criticism was made of the direction authorizing the
jury, in assessing plaintiff's damages, to consider "the prospect of a
speedy death," and the "loss of enjoyment which he has sustained."
In 1885 '2 and in 1913 "' the Scottish courts intimated, without
so holding, that shortening of life expectancy is a distinct head of
damages. In 1934 the Court of Session came squarely to grips with
the problem in Reid v. Lanarkshire.84 The Lord Ordinary, in assess-
ing damages for negligent injuries resulting in death, had expressed
the view that the victim's mental anguish from anticipation of earlier
death is the basis on which compensation is allowed for shortening of
life expectancy. 5 The pursuer reclaimed, and the case came before the
Court of Session, which thought the damages awarded were adequate
but the theory on which the Lord Ordinary granted them incorrect.
The Court held that wrongful shortening of a person's life expectancy
is compensable as an absolute injury without proof of any mental an-
guish or conscious suffering; that while no precise standard exists
for measuring such damages "the weight to be given to this element
must be moderate."
As long ago as 1909, the Supreme Court of Alberta recognized
that a person has a legal interest in the normal continuation of his life
31. The court further held that the jury should not compensate the loss of future
income by giving the value of an annuity for the same amount as the plaintiff's life
for his economic prospects would need to be discounted by multiple contingencies
which might have occurred such as onset of independent disabling disease,
premature death, failure in practice, etc. It held, too, that an exceptional fee of a
professional man (5,000 guineas), such as he might receive only once in a lifetime,
should not be included in calculating plaintiff's average earnings.
32. M'Master v. Caledonian Ry. Co., 13 Sess. Cas. Sc. 252 (1885).
33. M'Enaney v. Caledonian Ry Co., 2 Scots L. T. 293 (1913).
34. 1 Scots L. T. 54 (1934).
35. Id. at 80.
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and so a right to damages for its wrongful shortening. In the case
of one whose life expectancy has already been shortened by sickness
or affliction, the interest is still to have the full measure of life which
nature will allow, free of further curtailment by another's wrong. The
vital question is whether the defendant's wrongful conduct has further
reduced a life expectancy already impaired. Thus in M'Garry v.
Canada West Coal Co., Ltd.,"6 it appeared that a man destined to die
of cancer in the not distant future, had sustained a fracture of his
leg as a result of the defendant's negligence. This injury, according to
medical evidence, so aggravated his pre-existing disease that the vic-
tim's death was hastened by a year or a year and a half. The court
held it was not unreasonable to allow damages of $600 for this
shortening of life expectancy. 7
Practical implications: admissibility of evidence of death hastened
by injury. Even after Flint v. Lovell Is explicitly recognized wrongful
shortening of life expectancy to be a distinct head of damages in per-
sonal injury cases, some misapprehension persisted in England that the
basis of such an award was mental anguish arising from the victim's
awareness of impending death. In Slater v. Spreag,9 where decedent
sustained a fractured skull when struck by defendant's negligently
operated car and was unconscious from the moment of impact until he
died two days later, the court held that nothing could be allowed for
shortening of life expectancy as the injured man could have experienced
no conscious mental anguish, pain or suffering. This same view was
expressed by the trial judge in Rose v. Ford 40 where a young woman
23 years of age remained in a state of coma from the moment of her
injury in a motor car collision until her death four days later. She
had sustained a compound fracture of her right leg and thigh in an
accident on August 4, 1934; two days later, gangrene set in and the
leg was amputated, but the infection had already spread above the
point of severance and on August 8 she died. Her father, as adminis-
trator, brought a statutory action 41 against the defendant to recover
36. 2 Alberta 299 (1909).
37. It is reversible error to exclude evidence offered by defendant to prove that
prior to the accident plaintiff was in poor health and had really suffered shortening
of his life expectancy through operation of these independent, pre-existing causes.
Adams v. Kaiser 285 Pac. 751 (Cal. 1930). The defendant should always take a full
inventory of plaintiff's state of health immediately before the accident, with the hope
of minimizing the effects attributable to it.
38. Note 27 srua.
39. 153 L.T. 297 (K.B. 1935).
40. [1937] A.C. 826, 3 All. E.R. 359.
41. Under Lord Campbell's Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict., c. 93) as amended by the
Fatal Accidents Act of 1908; and the Act 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41, providing that, with
certain exceptions, ". . . on the death of any person after the commencement of
this Act [i.e., July 25, 1934] all causes of action subsisting against' or vested in him
shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of his estate."
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damages in respect of (a) pain and suffering, (b) the loss of the leg,
and (c) the shortening of reasonable expectation of life of the de-
ceased. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was mistaken
in assuming that damages for wrongful shortening of life expectancy
are allowed as compensation for mental anguish resulting from the
victim's anticipation of premature death, but that such an injury in-
volves an absolute loss not dependent upon the injured man's state of
mind. Tfiis view was accepted in full by the House of Lords on further
appeal of the case.42
Several consequences flow from this doctrine that it is an absolute
injury to a person's rights of personality to amputate part of his pro-
spective life by a wrongful act. Damages may be recovered even though
the victim was almost instantly killed,4" or survived for a time without
regaining consciousness after the impact," .or developed traumatic
dementia from a serious head injury,45 or was an infant too young to
experience mental anguish from awareness of approaching death,
46
or was an adult unaware that the injuries would probably shorten his
future life.
42. The Court of Appeal had held that the cause of action would not survive
death of the victim, [1936] 1 K.B. 90, and this was the ground upon which their
decision was reversed by the House of Lords. That wrongful shortening of another's
life involves an absolute loss for which the victim may have amages, independently
of mental anguish, was firmly settled in Scotland by the case of Reid v. Lanarkshire
Traction Co. Ltd., supra, note 34.
43. Murphy v. New York & New Haven R.R. Co., 30 Conn. 184 (1861); Rose
v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 3 All. E.R. 359; Shepherd v. Hunter, [1938] 2 All. E.R.
587, (C.A.) (3 year old child died 10 minutes after accident) ; Morgan v. Scoulding
[1938] 1 K.B. 786 (D, driver of motor car, negligently collided with motor cyclist;
latter struck his head on curb and died almost instantly); Chant v. Read [1939]
2 K.B. 346, 2 All E.R. 286 (Wife killed when husband's motor car collided with
motor cycle; when H sued X for damages for wrongful shortening of his wife's life
expectancy, X sought contribution from H as a joint tortfeasor. Held: denied, for
reason that the right to contribution was dependent upon whether the wife had a
right to sue her husband for loss of expectation of life; held: no, because the Mar-
ried Women's Property Act, 1882, S. 12 (as amended) authorizes a wife to sue her
husband only for injuries to her property and her expectation of life is not "property"
within the meaning of that legislation).
44. Rose v. Ford, supra note 43 (in continuous coma for four days from time
of accident until death), overruling Slater v. Spreag, 153 L.T. 297 (K.B. 1935);
Benham v. Gambling, 57 T.L.R. 177 (H.L. 1940) (22 year old child so seriously
injured in overturn of car caused by D's negligence that it died the same day without
regaining consciousness); Stebbe v. Laird, 45 Manitoba 541, 1 D.L.R. 240 (K.B.
1938) (11 year old girl, struck by D's car, sustained a head injury from which she
was continuously unconscious until her death 9 days later).
45. Roach v. Yates, [1938] 1 K.B. 256 (C.A. 1938).
46. Turbyfield v. Great Western Ry. Co., 54 T.L.R. 221, 158 L.T. 135 (K.B.
1938) (An 8 year old girl seriously injured when she was run down by defendant's
horse and dray on a footpath, died 9 days later) ; Bailey v. Howard, [1938] 1 K.B.
453 (C.A.), 4 All. E.R. 827 (Defendant, while learning to drive a car, negligently
collided with a perambulator standing in front of a house, so injuring a 3 year old
girl that she died next day); Ellis v. Raine, [1939] 2 K.B. 180 (C.A.) 1 All. E.R.
104 (8 year old boy killed by negligent operation of defendant's motor-car); Ben-
ham v. Gambling, supra note 44; Cullen v. Jackson, 85 Sol. J. 10 (K.B. 1941)
(Two girls, one 8 and one 11, fatally injured when knocked down by defendant's
car).
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It is indispensable to clear analysis of the elements of damage in
a personal injury case that the distinction between absolute loss and
mental anguish be sharply maintained. The truth is that both factors
may be compensated in a single case without any overlapping of dam-
ages: the shortening of life expectancy as an absolute loss or amputa-
tion of life substance; and mental anguish resultant upon fear of early
death (or of dire complications) as an actionable disturbance of mental
tranquillity. Virtually all courts now allow damages for mental an-
guish reasonably produced by particular personal injuries and their
potential consequences, or reasonably certain to occur in the future.47
It seems therefore clear that a plaintiff is entitled to prove that his
injuries are calculated to shorten his life expectancy as a step in show-
ing that mental anguish was reasonably engendered in him by learn-
ing such fact." This is true even though the law of the jurisdiction
denies direct compensation for the psychic loss which plaintiff sustains
in having his future life cut short by the defendant's wrong.49
47. Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11 Cal.2d 576, 81 P.2d 894
(1938); City of Richmond v. Hill, 195 Ky. 566, 242 S.W. 867 (1922) ; Brickley v.
St. Louis Merchant's Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 259 S.W. 476 (Mo. 1924); Ft.
Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Kidwell, 249 S.W. 303 (Tex. 1922), certified questions
answered, 112 Tex. 89, 245 S.W. 667 (1922).
The weight of authority is that damages may be recovered for mental pain
suffered in contemplation of a permanent mutilation or disfigurement of the person
though a few isolated cases hold that future mental anguish from such cause is too
remote to be considered an element of damage. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 66, p. 554,
n.73-75.
Damages have been allowed for mental anguish occasioned by apprehension of
a variety of reasonably feared future consequences of a physical injury: Elliott v.
Arrowsmith, 149 Wash. 631, 272 Pac. 32 (1928) (Dread of future illness or death) ;
Macke v. Sutterer, 224 Ala. 681, 141 So. 651 (1932) ; Fehely v. Senders, 170 Ore.
457, 135 P.2d 283 (1943) (Fear of miscarriage); Halloran v. New England Tel. &
Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143 (1921) (Injury to heart precluding life-saving
surgery needed to cure pre-existing malignant condition) ; Davis v. Murray, 29 Ga.
App. 120, 113 S.E. 827 (1922) (Fear of pregnant woman that injuries will cause
child to be born deformed) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Russell, 215 Ala. 600, 111
So. 753 (1927) ; May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 271 Pac. 789 (1928) ; Rome Ry.
& Light Co. v. Duke, 26 Ga. App. 52, 105 S.E. 386 (1920) (Apprehension as to
effects of injury upon future ability to earn a living) ; Walker v. Boston & Maine R.
Co., 71 N.H. 271, 51 Atl. 918 (1902) (Fear of future insanity).
48. Roche, L.J. in Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354, 366. Ramsdell v. Grady, 97
Me. 319 (1903); Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940); Choicener
v. Walters Amusement Agency, 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929); Fournier v.
Zinn, 257 Mass. 575, 154 N.E. 268 (1926); Alberti v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.Co., 118
N.Y. 77, 23 N.E. 35, (1889). But see, Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co. v. Johnson,
191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922) (Held: no tiamages recoverable for mental anguish
caused by peril to one's life when he did not realize danger he was in until long
after a railway locomotive had collided with his car at a crossing; nor due to fear
of a fatal termination, during the period of his convalescence, after regaining
consciousness at the hospital 8 weeks after the accident, this being a remote conse-
quence of past negligence). This holding seems questionable unless one can say the
apprehensions were unreasonable under the special facts of the case.
49. Roche, L.J. in Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354, 366; Richmond Gas Co. v.
Baker, 146 Ind. 600, 45 N.E. 1049 (1897) (Even in this case which we have criti-
cized so roundly for its erroneous refusal of damages for wrongful shortening of life
expectancy, Howard, J. expressly admitted that ". . . if the condition of the in-
jured person is such that a shortening of life may be apprehended, this may be con-
sidered in determining the extent of the injury, the consequent ability to make a
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It seems equally clear that all jurisdictions will, or should, admit
testimony that defendant's wrongful conduct probably shortened plain-
tiff's life for the further reason that it is relevant evidence tending to
prove the severity of the injuries sustained, their permanence and their
likely effect upon his future earning capacity."0 The very fact that an
injury is likely to shorten the plaintiff's future life implies that it will
have a permanent and continuing effect upon his health during the
interim. Now it is true that even though shortening of life expectancy
is admissible for the limited purpose of proving mental anguish, or
the gravity and effects of the injuries sustained, the defendant is en-
titled to an instruction restricting the jury to such use of the evidence
and telling them that no damages may be allowed for the shortening of
life itself. Whether such a direction is psychologically effective is very
doubtful, to say the least. In practice, the fact that the plaintiff's
injuries have shortened his life expectancy can always be gotten into
evidence and one is entitled to think that such information will ordi-
narily influence the jury's verdict, whatever the restrictive instructions
laid down by the court. Would it not be more satisfactory to recognize
shortening of life expectancy as an injury to be compensated and re-
quire the jury to assess damages separately for that item, thus enabling
their true action to be seen, reviewed, and, if need be revised?
RESOLUTION OF DAMAGES GENERALLY INTO ECONOMIC Loss AND
PsYCHIC CONSEQUENCES
We have seen that English courts have recognized the dual nature
of the interest in respect to one's life expectancy, as including both
economic and psychic factors. Compared with this development of
English law, American precedents dealing with the subject are meagre
both in number and in breadth of reasoning. Few of our courts have
given articulate consideration to the problem. Of those that have, the
majority have compensated the victim for shortening of life expectancy
in respect to impairment of earning capacity of the victim, where per-
sonal injuries wrongfully inflicted upon him have caused his total and
permanent disability or death. Along with this has grown up the more
living and the bodily and mental suffering which will result."); Choicener v. Wait-
ers Amusement, 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929) ; Farrington v. Stoddard, 115
F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940); Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Au-
thority and N.H. Gas & Electric Co., 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1 (1943).
50. Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, Choicener v. Walters Amusement, Farrington
v. Stoddard, mtpra note 49. Toledo W. & W.R. Co. v. Baddeley, 54 Ill. 19, 5 Am.
Rep. 71 (1870) ; Houston Electric Co., v. McDade, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 497, 79 S.W.
100 (1904) ; 20 Am. Jum.: Evidence, § 872, "Life Expectancy."
51. The scientific approach to damages would seem to require breaking the com-
pensation down into the ultimate categories of injury legally redressible.
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articulate minority view which refuses damages for loss of earnings
beyond the time of the decedent's death.5"
Aside from this minority view, the real question is whether the
measure of damages is to be restricted to this economic loss or shall
include, also, injury to the victim's psychic expectancies-his prospects
of a good and happy life. It may be argued, on the one hand, that
the law of damages should grant compensation only for injuries rea-
sonably susceptible of mathematical measurement.53 But the fact
is that personal injuries can hardly ever be compensated on a purely
mathematical basis, and the courts know it.5" A little reflection will
show that multiple and complex factors enter into the evaluation of
any substantial injury to the human body. It is evident that no mathe-
matical standard can be applied in compensating pain or mental suffer-
ing. Nevertheless, the courts, seeing the reality of the injury caused
by the defendant's wrong, have thought it better to accept the risks
of some speculation in the jury's deliberations than to absolve the
wrongdoer from liability. Limitation of damages to economic ex-
52. This apparent conflict of authority is explicable by the fact that while vir-
tually all courts are agreed that the pecuniary injury due to destruction of the vic-
tim's economic life expectancy should be paid for by the wrongdoer, many states have
both survival statutes and wrongful death acts. To prevent double damages, and to
secure to dependents certain recovery of their pecuniary loss, many of our state courts
hold that under the survival statute the administrator can recover loss of earnings
only until the time of decedent's death. Allen v. Burdette, 66 Ohio App. 236, 32
N.E.2d 852 (1940). Lost earnings beyond that time are reserved to make good the
pecuniary loss suffered by dependents and recoverable by them from the wrongdoer
under the Wrongful Death Act. But this rule of administrative convenience and
expediency co-exists with the majority rule that the measure of damages to de-
cedent's estate for his wrongful death includes the income which the victim stood to
earn or accumulate throughout his economic life expectancy as it existed prior to his
injury. Measure of Damages in Action for Personal Injuries Commewed by De-
ceased in His Lifetitne and Revived by Personal Representative, 7 A.L.R. 1355,
(1920), 26 A.L.R. 593 (1923).
If no dependents are left by deceased, and hence no eligible claimants under the
wrongful death act, the risk of double damages is eliminated, and under the better
view, decedent's personal representative suing under a survival statute can recover
the full loss of prospective income; West v. Boston & Me. R.R., 81 N.H. 522, 129
Atl. 768 (1925).
53. To press the doctrine of certainty in nwasurenent of damages beyond the
point of requiring use of the best evidence and techniques currently available would
result in a shifting of the risk of loss from wrongdoer to innocent victim. It would
tend to put the more delicate interests of personality beyond the pale of legal pro-
tection. But the law has already gone too far in redressing these to turn back (as,
for instance, in compensating pain and mental anguish) and in moving forward the
challenge will be to find better methods for preventing abuse of the license to com-
pensate substantial psychic injuries, non-economic in their connotation. Thus, in the
Law-Science Program, we are interested in the perfection of methods for determining
objectively whether the plaintiff is obtuse to pain, has average sensitivity or feels it
acutely because of hypersensitivity. See NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON "SCIENTIFIC
PROOF AND RELATIONS OF LAW AND MEDICINE" (1st ser. 1943); Wolff, Hardy and
Goodell, The Pain Threshold in Man, 99 AM. J. PsycHrIAT. 744 (1943).
54. Baron Parke declared as long ago as 1847 in Arnsworth v. South Eastern
Ry. Part I, 11 Jur. 758, 759 (1847) that ". . . it is impossible to form an esti-
mate of the value of human life either to a man himself or to others connected with
him." Yet this did not stop the courts from putting the burden upon the community
conscience (the jury) of finding the best possible answer in particular cases.
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pectancy alone would in some cases entirely eliminate damages for
shortening of life expectancy. The elderly pensioner or the life termer
in a penitentiary may have no calculable prospects of gainful employ-
ment, but who will say that if either of these has his health or happiness
shattered by personal injuries wrongfully inflicted, this psychic loss
is to go uncompensated? Psychic as well as pecuniary effects of per-
sonal injury must be recognized if the law of damages is to attain a
philosophy as broad as the values which men everywhere impute to
personality and life. To restrict compensation to pecuniary loss would
be to retreat to a materialistic, mathematical conception of life too
narrow for justice and too far behind our present stage of legal evolu-
tion. It would lead in many cases to fragmentary redress of grave
injuries to interests of personality.
Furthermore, when the victim's life expectancy is impaired (nar-
rowed) rather than shortened it seems clear that he should recover dam-
ages. This problem was considered as long ago as 1869 by Chief Jus-
tice Cockburn in the English case of Fair v. The London and North-
Western Railway Co.55 In that case a 27 year old unmarried minister,
possessed of excellent health and earning £250 a year, was seriously
injured in a train wreck. In an action seeking compensatory damages
from defendant, he showed that the accident had made him permanently
deaf, had injured his spine causing permanent paralysis of the lower
extremities and some impairment of sensation, converting him into a
helpless invalid for the remainder of his life. The jury returned a
verdict allowing plaintiff general damages of £5,000 and £250 for
medical and other expenses. In denying a motion for a new trial orA
the ground of excessive damages, the court said:
"Now the rule is that where a railway company undertakes
to carry a passenger and he receives an injury in consequence of
their negligence, he is entitled to receive compensation for them,
and in assessing that compensation the jury should take into
account two things; first, the pecuniary loss he sustains by the
accident; secondly, the injury he sustains to his person, or his
physical capacity of enjoying life. When they come to the con-
sideration of the pecuniary loss, they have to take into account
not only his personal loss but his incapacity to earn a future im-
proved income. . . Then as to the second ground, undoubtedly
health is the greatest of all physical blessings; and to say that
when it is utterly shattered, no compensation is to be made for
it is really perfectly extravagant."
Fair v. Railway is the type of case where permanent injuries cause
material impairment of the victim's enjoyment of life. This results
usually from deprivation of pleasurable pursuits and is a separate and
55. 21 L.T. 326 (1869).
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distinct item of damage from mental anguish, as the latter is properly
classifiable as a species of pain. In Phillips v. London and South-
Western Railway Co., 6 it appeared that plaintiff, a physician, had been
totally and permanently disabled by injuries negligently inflicted which
served to reduce him to "a powerless helplessness". The trial judge
in that case instructed the jury to take into account as one item of
damage the victim's loss of enjoyment of life.17 A striking applica-
tion of the principle is to be found in the more recent case of Heaps v.
Perrite, Ltd.f where the Court of Appeal in England upheld as not
excessive an award of £10,000 damages made to a plaintiff who lost
both hands as a result of the defendant's negligence. It was recognized
that no such damages could be justified for mere loss of earning power,
and in upholding the award, Greer, L. J., relied principally upon the
great psychic injury plaintiff had sustained in being rendered incapable
of performing simple acts important to his wellbeing and happiness. 9
The right of one permanently injured by wrongful conduct to
recover damages for resultant impairment (but not shortening) of his
capacity to enjoy life has been before American courts with increasing
frequency since 1890. Virtually all of the better reasoned decisions
have held such psychic injury to be a distinct and proper head of dam-
ages. They reason that, the injury being real, want of certainty in the
measure of damages should defeat redress here no more than in similar
situations.6" The prevalent opinion among our courts seems to be
that in such cases it is better to let the common sense and judgment
of the jury prescribe what would be reasonable compensation, while
counting upon judicial surveillance to minimize risks of excessive
verdicts.
Legal redress for substantial impairment of the capacity to enjoy
life involves rejection of the now intolerable conception that personality
56. 5 Q.B.D. 78 (1879).
57. This surely means the savour and salt rather than mere ecstasy, and, we
venture to believe, the ability to express personality through natural endowments and
acquired conditioning rather than merely impairment of acquisitive talents and in-
terests of substance.
58. [19371 2 All E.R. 60 (C.A.).
59. As, for instance, feeding oneself, dressing and performing habitual acts. The
defen'dant should investigate fully all the possibilities which modem rehabilitation
medicine has to offer in the way of reasonable surgical correction, retraining tech-
niques, and prosthetic aids. The plaintiff has a duty to minimize his own damages
which may well embrace acceptance of such corrective procedures particularly if
offered to him without expense.
60. It would seem that evidence of loss of enjoyment is being admitted as having
probative value upon the seriousness of injury and the extent of incapacity, and
tends, where special 'damages are denied, to attain compensation under the head of
general damages, or by swelling the allowance for pain and suffering and mental
anguish. For collected cases, see Loss of Enjoyment as an Elemnent of, or Factor
in Determining, Damages for Bodily Iniry, 120 A.L.R. 535 (1939). The case of
Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938) would
seem to be wrong in denying damages for loss of pleasure in playing the violin
which was directly due to an injury to plaintiff's hand negligently caused by defend-
ant.
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has meaning and value only in the economic sphere. There is no
reason why investigation should not readily reveal what the previous
habits and pursuits of the plaintiff were before his injury and the
extent to which these have been rendered impossible of continued per-
formance by his incapacity.
We must remember that an award of money damages is the only
real remedy which our law affords to redress injurious invasions of
interests of personality."' The course of Anglo-American social evolu-
tion has been toward increasing valuation of the dignity and importance
of the common man, and, despite the apparent contradiction offered by
recent wars, toward a growing reverence for life. Only in so far as
the measure of damages covers the distinguishable elements in the
personality spectrum can we be said to have afforded legal protection
for these non-economic interests in human existence.
It is therefore, of considerable advisory importance to consider
what basis may exist for projecting a scheme for dividing injuries to
interests of personality into economic and non-economic factors. In
undertaking such an analysis, one is impressed by the variety of situ-
ations in which our law is prepared to uphold substantial damages
where the injury to personality is perceptible or great, but resultant
loss of money is small or undemonstrable. Such damages are awarded
despite the lack of any mathematical basis for their measurement.
Science and logic (and defendant's lawyers) long for particularization
and certainty in estimation of damages, while community conscience
and humanitarian instincts (and plaintiff's lawyers) seem satisfied to
resort to the judgment of common men when no such standards of
monetary admeasurement can be found.
Consider, for instance, the large verdicts for damages which our
courts are prone to sustain for extreme or permanently disabling in-
juries suffered by children so young that no one can justly prophesy
what they might have earned otherwise upon reaching maturity, nor
what alleviation Rehabilitation Medicine may have to offer a number
of years hence.62 It is the fact that such severe injuries cause gross and
61. Pound's quotation from Kipling (in Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L.
Rxv. 445, 446 (1915)) is apropos, concerning the Oriental's view of the Englishman:
"Is a man sad? Give him money, say the Sahibs. Is he dishonored? Give him
money say the Sahibs. Hath he a wrong upon his head? Give him money, say the
Sahibs." KIPLING, Dray Wara Tow Dee, IN BLACK AND WmiTE 4 (Outward
Bound ed.). The remedy of honorable amends and the like might be valuable in
dealing with certain transient disturbances of mental tranquillity engendered by de-
famatory utterances, invasions of privacy or other socially reprehensible behavior,
but it is not an apt mode of redress for absolute losses resulting from invasions of
personality.
62. E.g., Ells v. Scandrett, 28 F. Supp. 16 (D.C. Idaho 1938), appeal dismissed,
106 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1939) (4 year old boy: $40,000) ; Junge v. Midland Counties
Public Service Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 154, 100 P.2d 1073 (1940) (13 year old boy:
$35,000) ; Magaraci v. Santa Marie, 130 Conn. 323, 33 A.2d 424 (1943) (12 year old
boy: $12,500) ; Bowman v. Healey's Inc., 16 NJ. Misc. 113, 197 Atl. 655, appeal dis-
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permanent impairment of various modalities of personality expression
rather than the calculable economic loss which determines reasonable-
ness of the damages in such cases.
In other cases, the physical injury is such that the effect does not
express itself in reduction of earning power, and the compensation
granted is based upon absolute loss or impairment of a useful or
enjoyable anatomic member or physiological function.63 This willing-
ness of courts to compensate pro tanto extinguishment of the per-
sonality, where narrowing rather than shortening of the spectrum is
involved, is a persuasive argument for extending like protection to the
longitudinal dimensions of personality (i.e. against its wrongful
shortening).
So-called physical and mental pain induced by any physical agency
which the defendant brings into contact with plaintiff's body is com-
pensable whether or not any real tissue damage is caused and irrespec-
tive of resultant pecuniary loss.64 A fortiori, such pain as is induced
by traumatic disruption or injury of bodily tissues is compensable, with
the added consequence that secondary mental anguish may now qualify
for inclusion in the measure of damages.65 It is true that gross dis-
figurement may render unemployable, because of prejudice of em-
inissed, 121 NJ.L. 198, 1 A.2d 848 (1938) (17 year old boy: $15,000); Carballal
v. Pilgrim Laundry, 254 App. Div. 773, 5 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1938) (5Y2 year old girl:
$15,000) ; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Perrin, 179 Okla., 142, 64 P.2d 309 (1936) (4
year old girl: $25,000).
Observe that these verdicts were upheld prior to the current inflation and that
much larger awards are now held reasonable as courts take judicial notice of the
diminished purchasing power of the dollar. Kircher v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 32
Cal.2d 176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948). See also, 18 A.L.R. 564 (1922). For more recent
cases, see Armentrout v. Virginia Ry. Co., 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948) (13 month
old boy) : $160,000 for partial loss of both arms; reversed as excessive, settled for
$75,000); Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 715, 207 P.2d 864 (1949)
(12 year old boy: $91,000) ; Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 87 N.E. 2d 307 (II. 1949)
(7 year old boy; terribly disfiguring burns; $65,000).
63. Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris County Court of Common Pleas, 93 N.J.
Law 93, 107 At. 433 (1919) (Certiorari by employer to remove an award made
under Workmen's Compensation Act in favor of an injured servant; held: award
affirmed). Minturn, J. said: "The lower court found that as a result of the injury
(loss of a testicle) the defendant's morale, courage and marital efficiency were
lessened. Whatever view medical experts may entertain upon that phase of the
case, the indisputable fact remains that the injured defendant has suffered the loss
of a portion of his anatomy which nature implanted in the human organism as a
dual reservoir of complete efficiency, and that to deprive him of its attributes is to
take from him a component part of the perfect genus homo. This impairment may not
prove to be so conspicuous in the ability to produce wages, but there are other
spheres for the employment of human energy, talents and the possession of physical
attributes beside the industrial world."
Kierkowsky v. Connell, 43 Pa. Co. 250, 11 Schuylkill Leg. Rec. 163. (1913)
aff'd., 253 Pa. 566, 98 Atl. 766 (1916) (Damages recoverable for loss of teeth though
earning capacity not affected). And observe that if injuries result in impotency,
sterility or loss of childbearing power, compensation is allowed for this impairment
of non-economic physiological functions affecting ability of the individual to live a
normal, full life. 18 ORE. L. REv. 259, 260 (1939).
64. Gerber v. Pines, 79 Sol. J. 13 (K.B. 1934); Ernen v. Crofwell, 272 Mass.
172, 172 N.E. 73 (1930).
65. 25 CJ.S. 548, Damages § 62, 63 (1941).
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ployers, a person able and willing to work 66 and that modest injuries
to a vulnerable person may cause initial mental anguish induced in him
to reach the proportions of a disabling traumatic neurosis 17 and so
we should not lose sight of the fact that psychic injury may express
itself secondarily in the form of economic injury.
Another interesting example of psychic injury is presented where
a major consequence of the defendant's tort is to destroy the special
joy or happiness which plaintiff derived from his accustomed participa-
tion in a creative art or pleasureable activity, now no longer open to
him because of the physical disability he has sustained. Courts differ
as to whether compensation should be allowed for such an item 6s but
it would seem plausible to permit proof of all interferences with habitual
activities of a personal and socially useful character, lumping these
under a generic heading of "deprivation of social amenities through
personal injury."
The dissection of non-economic or psychic losses from interwoven
economic damage produced by personal injury may be accomplished
by considering the proper measure of damages where, for one reason
or another, no loss of earnings can be proven. In the case of very
young children who are permanently disabled by injury the economic
interest is seriously invaded, though the measurement is difficult and
conjectural. But where the victim is an aged person who has retired
from gainful pursuits, or a person who prior to the defendant's derelic-
tion had been reduced to a state of complete dependency by operation
of law, or by injury or disease, or by constitutional defect, the basis
of compensation necessarily shifts from economic to psychic interests.69
66. Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N.Y. 199 (1919). And see Olsen v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 62 Idaho 423, 112 P.2d 1005 (1941).
67. Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses it Court, 30 VA. L. Rxv. 87 (1943).
68. Damages denied: Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85
P.2d 28 (1938) (Loss of ability to play violin for personal pleasure; court regarded
this loss of enjoyment as "too speculative and conjectural to form a sound basis
for the assessment of damages"). This view seems erroneous as courts which sub-
scribe to it are ready to grant damages for pain and mental anguish which are
psychic injuries equally subjective, and difficult of measurement. Damages allowed:
Kramer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. Co., 226 Wis. 118, 276 N.W. 113 (1937);
38 MicH. L. Rv. 97 (1939). See note 63 supra.
It would seem that the main controversy is not whether such a psychic loss can
be proved, as bearing upon the extent of the injury and disability, or even allowed
expressly or covertly, to influence general damages in an unspecified way, but whether
it may be compensated as a specific item of loss. Courts now are generally receptive
to introduction of evidence calculated to show any and all types of impairments of
plaintiff's pre-existing integrated personality attributable to personal injuries.
69. Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354; Feay v. Barnwell, [1938] 1 All E.R. 31;
Fulton v. Chouteau Cy. Farmer's Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025 (1934) (61 year
old man; earnings $16,000 to $18,000 per year, however; legs rendered virtually
useless; awarded $76,112); Brannock v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Ry. Co.,
D.C.N.D. Wash. E.D., File No. 801 (60 year old carman suffered loss of two legs
and one arm; jury verdict for $102,985; settled June, 1949), Verdicts or Awards
Exceeding $50,000., 4 NACCA LAw J. 280, 287 (Nov. 1949) ; Jennings v. McCowan,
55 S.E.2d 552 (S.C. 1949) (Death case; deceased was 56 years of age, had a life
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Substantial damages have been allowed to criminal offenders for per-
sonal injuries wrongfully inflicted even though their sentences involved
such long terms of confinement that they had no determinable prospects
of future gainful employment.7" Even more interesting is the judicial
inclination to uphold substantial damages for serious personal injuries
suffered by mental patients who have no past work record and no
arguable prospect of gainful employment in future. In the case of
Scolavino v. State, 1 the staff of a New York mental hospital negligently
left patients on a violent ward without adequate supervision by attend-
ants. Benturira, a patient suffering from psychosis and epileptic
clouded states, and well known to be assaultive and dangerous, was left
in restraint sheets, unattended, in a bed near Scolavino who likewise
was so restrained. At 2 o'clock in the morning, Benturira broke out
of the restraint sheets, which experience had shown were not uniformly
effectual, and brutally attacked Scolavino, fracturing his nose and
putting out both his eyes. Scolavino had been in the hospital for sev-
eral years under a diagnosis of psychosis with mental deficiency.
There was no prospect that he could later have been returned to society
as a useful or even merely as a harmless member, irrespective of the
assault. All physicians were agreed that his mental age was less than
half that of a normal person, that he was of a disagreeable and as-
saultive nature, and that his condition was incurable. In assessing
damages the Court of Claims, after adverting to these facts, frankly
said:
"Experiments in allowing him to return home had proved
unfortunate. It may be safely concluded that he was in any event
doomed to a lifetime spent in mental institutions. This being the
case, his living at State expense is assured, and loss of potential
earnings is not an element in assessing damages." 72
The psychic injuries taken into account were pain, mental anguish,
permanent loss of vision and consequent deprivation of such amenities
as ability to read simple books. The Court of Claims awarded plain-
tiff $9,000 but on further appeal this was held to be inadequate by
expectancy of 16.2 years; earned $2,475 per year; was survived by wife and two
children, 14 and 20 years of age; award for $85,000). Consider, too, the case of the
housewife, Catherine Jeffers v. City and County of San Francisco, Superior Ct.,
No. 34965 (Sept. 1946), 3 NACCA LAW J. 300 (P. a housewife, sustained injuries
resulting in loss of one leg; no loss of earnings, no medical or special damages be-
cause she was treated by Navy; judgment of $100,000; allowed to stand as not ex-
cessive).
70. Bhullar v. State, 248 App. Div. 802, 289 N.Y.S. 41 (1936); Kusah v.
McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918). There is less litigation of this sort
than one would expect, doubtless because most states have enacted statutes which
either declare a convicted felon to be civilly dead or incompetent to maintain a suit.
71. 62 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1946).
72. Id. at 25.
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the Appellate Division" which increased damages to $20,000 and
this sum was upheld as reasonable by the New York Court of Appeals . 4
We have sought by our reconnoitering, to test the hypothesis that
interests of personality require the law, in personal injury litigation,
to construct a theory of redress broad enough to authorize substantial
damages for psychic as well as for economic injury. This brings us
to the important question as to how damages may reasonably be
measured in respect to psychic injuries of a non-economic sort, includ-
ing shortening of the victim's life expectancy. On the possibility of
achieving sensible criteria for judicial guidance, fair to the plaintiff, yet
calculated to prevent exploitation of psychic injuries as run-away fac-
tors in swelling damages, is apt to depend the attitude of many courts
toward admitting or excluding psychic injury from shortening of life
expectancy as a discrete item of recoverable damage in personal injury
cases.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES AND PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN RESPECT TO
ALLEGED SHORTENING OF LIFE EXPECTANCY
Three distinct items of damage may result from the wrongful
shortening of a person's life expectancy: mental anguish resulting from
awareness that his death has been accelerated, pro tanto reduction of
prospective earning capacity, and fractional loss of a future life which
promised to be predominantly happy or at least to have perceptible
value to its possessor. The last two consequences are absolute losses
compensable despite the victim's ignorance that his death has beert
hastened. 5 It is well for the law to consider these absolute economic
and psychic losses separately for two reasons: first, they are measurable
by different principles and second, damages allowed for them tend to
pass into different hands. Wrongful death acts give named bene.
73. Scolavino v. State, 271 App. Div. 618, 67 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1946).
74. Id., 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174 (1947). And see Koch v. City of Chicago,
297 Ill. App. 103, 17 N.E.2d 411 (1938) (12 year old subnormal boy: $10,000).
Note that the Scolavino case holds that mental suffering is a presumed conse-
quence of physical injury in the case of an insane person as well as of a sane person,
unless it is proved that his condition is such that he does not experience pain.
Attention is drawn to Murphy v. Friel, 328 Il1. App. 586, 66 N.E.2d 450 (1946),
holding that where a person of low intelligence is victim of an intentional wrong,
he can recover damages due to aggravated condition of the injury resulting from
his low intelligence.
In Anderson v. Lavelle, 285 Mich. 194, 280 N.W. 729 (1938), an action under a
Survival Act, it appeared that the decedent, a 6 year old child, was so injured by an
automobile negligently driven by defendant that she was rendered unconscious thereby
and remained so until she died 20 minutes later. She therefore suffered no pain or
mental anguish and as she had never been able to work, no pecuniary loss resulted
to next of kin from her death. Judgment on a jury verdict in defendant's favor was
affirmed on appeal. Query, whether it is justifiable to hold that the life of an insane
or mentally deficient person is wholly without value because the affliction has de-
stroyed the individual's economic productivity. Contrast Scolavbo v. State.
75. Note 42 supra.
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ficiaries a prior claim, usually free of the claims of creditors, for
"pecuniary loss" they sustain from destruction of decedent's earning
capacity; damages for destruction of psychic expectancy go to the
victim, if alive, or if he be dead, to his estate, subject to the claims of
creditors. Our concern now is to discover what considerations are
relevant in assessing damages for the psychic injury caused by shorten-
ing of life expectancy.
The Court of Appeal in Flint v. Lovell was preoccupied principally
with showing that the right of living person to have damages for
wrongful shortening of his life expectancy was not foreclosed by
Baker v. Bolton. Little was said concerning the nature of the interest
impaired, but no criticism was made of the ground upon which the
trial judge justified his action in awarding plaintiff damages of £4400,
namely: "There is no doubt that he has lost the prospect of an enjoy-
able, vigorous and happy old age which I am satisfied on the medical
testimony might have gone on for a number of years if this unhappy
accident had not occurred." This conception that the psychic injury
involved in shortening of one's life consists of lost prospects for future
happiness is accepted by all the later British decisions. We have seen
that the courts soon classified the injury as an absolute loss which the
law must redress as best it can, despite the want of any definite meas-
uring rod. In Flint v. Lovell, Lord Roach had ventured misgivings
about the dangers of excessive verdicts and speculative awards in
compensating shortening of life expectancy as a separate head of dam-
age. But conceding always the difficulty of assessing damages, and of
equating incommensurables,"6 the high Courts of Britain held fast
to the view that a real injury deserves redress, whatever the adminis-
trative difficulties may be. In extending a remedy, they hoped to
avoid excessive damages by:
(1) Reliance upon the prudence of the jury or trial judge in
assessing damages, it being recognized that the good sense of the
trier of fact must always be trusted where an imponderable is to be
valued, such as happiness, pain or mental anguish; "
76. This problem has always been readily conceded by the Judiciary in Great
Britain and while it has been seized upon as a weapon of attack by those who would
destroy the right to have damages for wrongful shortening of life expectancy (as,
for instance, 0. Kahn-Freund in Expectation of Happiness, 3 MoD. L. REV. 81
(1941)) it has done no more in fact than to lead the House of Lords to sharpen
its analysis of the measure of damages and to place a conservative ceiling on awards
as a preventfve for excessively variable or generous compensation of the injury.
See Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 57, 57 T.L.R. 177.
77. See Slesser, L.J. in Flint v. Lovell and Lord Shane in Reid v. Lanark-
shire Traction Co., [1934] S.C. 79, 83 (upon the whole the jury were entitled in a
great measure to take this matter into their own hands, and so long as they did not
do anything very extravagant that their verdict should stand). In Bailey v. Howard,
[1939] 1 K.B. 453, 458 (C.A.) 4 All. E.R. 827, Lord Justice Scott said: "In the
peculiar circumstances of this cause of action created by the Act of 1934 I see no
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(2) Reliance upon the trial court's charge on the measure of
damages to moor the jury by defining and illustrating those factors
which are to be considered and those which are to be ignored; 78
(3) Reliance upon prior precedents to furnish a criterion for
determining what would be a reasonable award in the case at bar; "
(4) Reliance upon judicial surveillance to detect and prune exces-
sive awards.80
Rose v. Ford was the next landmark in the British law, settling
as it did the proposition that the injured person acquired eo instanti a
cause of action for the wrongful shortening of his life which survives
to his administrator under the British survival statute of 1934,1 this
means of arriving at any sort of quantitative scale for the guidance of Judges or
juries except the gradual working out, chiefly through the common sense of juries,
of the sort of figures that in English civilization of today are to be regarded as rea-
sonable for damages under that particular head. Whether ultimately any sort of
scale will be worked out, or whether the assessment will remain permanently quite
empirical, one cannot say, but today my own view is that the right attitude of the
Courts to take is that it is essentially a matter for the appreciation of the jury under
a direction of the Judge that the measure of damages is that which the deceased per-
son possessed, and that the amount to be given should always be strictly reasonable,
and, if it errs at all, should err on the low side."
78. In Rose v. Ford Lord Wright said, at 848: "It is true that it has been con-
sidered that it is impossible to form an estimate of the value of human life whether
to the man himself or to others connected with him, to quote again the words of
Baron Parke in Arrnsworth's case (11 Jur. 758, 1847). But, in that very case
Parke B. was directing the jury to award damages under Lord Campbell's Act.
It was the first case under that Act and Parke B. did not, it seems, appreciate the
precise limits which were subsequently to be fixed for assessing the damages claim-
able by dependents. He seems to have directed the jury as if they were to award
general damages for loss of the deceased's man's life. He warned them that they
could not give an exact compensation, which, he said, was impossible just as much as
in the case of loss of limb or a wound; they were not to consider the value of exist-
ence as if bargaining with an annuity office, but were to calculate all accidents and
give a fair compensation. This direction might, it seems to me, in principle be ap-
plied to a case where a man's life has been wrongfully shortened and damages are
claimed under the Act of 1934. It answers the objection that it is impossible to put
a value on human life."
79. In Flint v. Lovell, £4400 was awarded to a 70 year old man in respect to
serious personal injuries expected to shorten his life expectancy from 9 years to 1
year; it appears that this precedent resulted in overgenerous allowances for wrong-
ful shortening of life expectancy, with considerable variations evident from one case
to another. Next, in Ford v. Rose, it appeared that a 23 year old woman injured
through defendant's negligence, died four days later, and the House of Lords con-
sidered E1,000 to be a reasonable award for shortening of her life expectancy. But
this sum had been stipulated in advance by counsel. Cases subsequent to Rose v.
Ford nevertheless used its award for comparative purposes. Finally, the House of
Lords in Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157, 57 T.L.R. 177, had to deal with the
almost instant death of a 22 year old male child, caused by defendant's negligent
driving of an automobile. The trial court had allowed £1200 damages for the
shortening of life expectancy; this was reduced by the Court of Appeal to ,6250 and
by the House of Lords £200, the point being emphasized that a more conservative
measure of damages was henceforth to be allowed for the item. There has been a
striking readiness among trial courts in England to make advisory use of these "ceil-
ings" set by higher courts, in controlling damages.
80. Both the Court of Appeals and the House of Lords in England have main-
tained a circumspect censorship to the end of preventing excessive variation or in-
flation of awards.
81. 24 and 25 Geo. 5, c. 41 (1934).
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being in no wise an action based upon death of the victim such as the
dictum of Baker v. Bolton forbade. In the Ford case, a motor car
collision caused by the defendant's negligence injured a 23 year old
girl so gravely that she remained in a state of coma for nearly all of
four days and then died. The Court of Appeal had found that £1,000
would be reasonable compensation for shortening of decedent's life if
the claim survived to her administrator.8 2 The House of Lords adopted
this finding saying: "How the damages are to be calculated is a ques-
tion which this House has not to decide, for there has been no quarrel
with the amount fixed by the Court of Appeal. . ." Nevertheless,
some of the Judges went on, by way of dictum, to point out certain
of the factors they thought relevant to such an inquiry. Thus, Lord
Wright said:
I think that, both on principle and on authority, this element
of damage-that is, for the shortening of life or for the loss of
the normal expectancy of life-was properly taken into calcula-
tion in Flint v. Lovell, and should be considered here, as Greer,
L. J., thought. The jury should be directed that they are en-
titled to take it into consideration along with other relevant
elements of damage, using their common sense to give what is
fair and moderate, in view of all the uncertainties and contin-
gencies of human life. Special cases may occur, such as that of
an infant, or an imbecile, or an incurable invalid, or a person in-
volved in hopeless difficulties. The judge or jury must do the
best they can, in the circumstances, in this as in other cases.8"
Lord Roche was clear that wrongful shortening of a person's life in-
volves an objective loss;
I regard impaired health and vitality, not merely as a cause
of pain and suffering, but as a loss of a good thing in itself. Loss
of expectation of life is a form in which impaired health and
vitality may express themselves as a result. In such a loss, there
is a loss of a temporal good, capable of evaluation in money, though
the evaluation is difficult. . . . Damages frequently have to be
estimated in a case such as the following: A person suffers physical
injuries of a nature to prevent him or her from living as full
and complete a life as before, not in the matter of earning power,
but in the matter of performing the functions and reaping the
enjoyments of a normal life. An analogous problem is now
presented. In the case I have outlined, partial loss of the good of
life over the normal period of life has to be measured. Here a
total loss of the good of life over part of the normal period of life
82. [1936] 1 K.B. 90 (C.A.).
83. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 849.
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has to be measured. I do not doubt that the measurement can
be made .
[The amount of the award for shortening of life] was ob-
viously and rightly arrived at without regard to the question of
the amount of future earnings, and solely on the basis of what life
was going to be worth to a healthy young woman, earning her
own living, with dependent parents, and with some prospects of
marriage. This method seems to me to be correct. It eliminates,
and rightly so, the question of rich and poor, and pays regard
to the normal and the average. A rich miser living in squalor, or
a very poor man deeply sunk in misery, might require special
treatment, but, ordinarily, a person may be assumed to have, or
be able to earn, enough to live his or her life, and to enjoy it.
Earning or income are otherwise, and to an extent beyond this,
irrelevant.8 4
Rose v. Ford provided a convenient measuring rod for many
harassed judges: the assumption that £1,000 was a reasonable award
for wrongfully shortening the life expectancy of a healthy, happy 23
year old girl to four days provided a criterion for estimating damages
in other cases and courts were glad to make use of it. 5 Still, it is to
their credit that they generally used the standard as a balance wheel
for their reckoning, not as a substitute for independent analysis; as a
ceiling rather than as a floor.
What weight is to be assigned to the quantum of expected life
destroyed by the defendant's wrong? In The Aizkarai Mendi 8 several
seamen of varying ages had lost their lives in a disaster at sea caused
by the defendant's negligence. The registrar in awarding damages to
surviving widows, refused to take ages or life expectancies of the vic-
tims into account, being of opinion that all had suffered the same loss
in respect to deprivation of their prospects of future happiness. He
reasoned thus: "They are all still in active life, and the joy they get
out of it is much the same whether they find it in what they have done
or in the hope of what they may do." Langton, J., in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division, held this view to be erroneous be-
lieving that, while the length of life lost may not be of chief importance
in a particular case, it is always relevant. He substituted larger awards
in respect to the younger men whose death involved a greater loss of
84. Id. at 859.
85. Virtually every English trial judge, in dealing with such cases, after Rose
v. Ford and before Benham v. Gambling, gave substantial or controlling weight to
the sum of E1,000 as a reasonable starting point in determining proper damages for
wrongful shortening of life expectancy.
86. [1938] P. 263, 3 All. E.R. 483.
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prospective life. Logic seems to require that damages be proportioned
to the length of life lost where the expectancy destroyed held promise of
a predominantly happy life. This follows from the fact that reduction of
the temporal dimension of life is an indispensable factor in the injury
we are considering and it would hardly do in measuring damages to
ignore the extent of the temporal loss. Conversely, the damages to be
allowed should be discounted by an amount proper to give effect to
any risks so peculiar to the victim that his life expectancy might have
been shortened by accident or illness unrelated to the defendant's wrong.
This consideration led the courts in The Aizkarai Mendi and in The
Oropesa s' to discount the damages somewhat because the victims were
sailors and therefore engaged in an extra-hazardous occupation.
Similar problems arise where an infant has been fatally injured.
It may be argued that such a child has a longer life span before him
than an adult, but one must not forget the risks of disease or injury
which lie between the ages of one and twenty-one. Nor can one very
well prophesy what an infant's lot in life will be, and estimate his
prospects until he has approached maturity and the path ahead of him
becomes discernible. It can be understood how these conflicting con-
siderations naturally led different courts to adopt opposite views as to
the proper measure of damages where the life of an infant had been
shortened by fatal injuries. Some thought that wrongful shortening
of the life expectancy of a healthy child should warrant greater com-
pensation than that allowed for such injury of a twenty-three year old
adult (Rose v. Ford) in as much as the temporal loss is greater and
proverbially the days of childhood are the happiest of one's life."8
Other courts stressed the vicissitudes of early life, the independent risks
of premature death from accident or disease in childhood, and the lack
87. [1942] P. 140, 58 T.L.R. 328.
88. Turbyfield v. Great Western Ry. Co., [1938] 54 T.L.R. 221 (K.B.), 158
L.T. 135. (8 year old girl died nine days after D negligently injured her; the court
felt that a happy child, with good future prospects, had lost 15 more years of life
than the 23 year old young woman whose administrator in Rose v. Ford was al-
lowed £1000; using that case as a measure, £1500 was awarded for wrongful shorten-
ing of decedent's life expectancy in the case at bar). See also, Bailey v. Howard,
[1939] 1 K.B. 453 (C.A.), 4 All. E.R. 827 (1938) (Rose v. Ford figure taken as a
reasonable standard, £1000 awarded for wrongful shortening of life expectancy of
3 year old girl who died day following injury). On appeal, £90 for loss of life
expectancy of a healthy, happy 3 year old child was held to be grossly inadequate
and a new trial was granted in Shepherd v. Hunter, [1938] 2 All. E.R. 587 (C.A.).
A new trial was granted for failure of jury to compensate loss of life expectancy of
8 year old boy killed by negligent operation of D's motor car in Ellis v. Raine, [1939]
2 K.B. 180, 1 All. E.R. 104.
Stebbe v. Laird, 45 Manitoba 541 (K.B. 1937) 1 D.L.R. -240 (1938) (Happy,
11 year old daughter of village blacksmith, in being killed, lost more years than
Miss Rose and should receive no less for the wrongful shortening of her life expec-
tancy: $5,000. awarded for this item of damage).
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of established prospects until an infant nears majority. They concluded
that forecasting an infant's prospects of future happiness involves added
speculations which should lead to more modest damages than would
be proper where defendant's wrongful act destroyed the life expectancy
of an adult. This latter view won acceptance of the House of Lords
in Benham v. Gambling," a case as important as Flint v. Lovell and
Rose v. Ford in the development of the doctrine we are considering.
British courts prior to 1940 had not attained consistency in the
size of awards they made for wrongful shortening of life expectancy.
Compiled records of trial and appeal courts, exhibited to the House
of Lords in Benham v. Gambling by consent of counsel, provoked
judicial comment as to the manifest variation in the awards made in
such cases."0 It was clear that a need existed for that tribunal to speak
authoritatively concerning the proper measure of damages. In the
Benham case, the facts revealed that young Gambling, an infant two
and one-half years of age, was riding in his parents' car when defendant
Benham negligently drove by in such manner that he caused the
Gambling vehicle to overturn. The child sustained serious injuries
from which he died on the same day without regaining consciousness.
The administrator of the infant's estate brought an action under the
survival statute seeking damages solely for wrongful shortening of
the child's life expectancy. Defendant admitted his negligence and
Mr. Justice Asquith, at the Winchester Assizes, entered damages for
£1200. This award was approved by the Court of Appeal, though it
thought the amount should be reduced to £250.1 The case was carried
by further appeal to the House of Lords which unanimously reduced
the damages awarded to £200. The Lord Chancellor took it as settled
by Rose v. Ford that the infant had a cause of action for the wrongful
shortening of his life and that it survived to his administrator. He
said: "The present appeal raises the problem of the assessment of
damages for 'loss of expectation of life' before this house for the first
time and it is indeed the only issue with which we are now con-
cerned." 02 It is important to the understanding of the court's action
to set out the main points which Lord Chancellor Simon made in
respect to the measure of damages. (Commentary of our own that
seems in order has been appended.)
89. [1941] A.C. 157, 57 T.L.R. 177.
90. Id. Lord Chancellor Simon at p. 161, T.L.R. at 179, mentions list of cases
(some in the reports, others only in shorthand notes), comments on these varia-
tions, and adverts to the fact that several judges had drawn attention to the need
for authoritative guidance on the subject of how to arrive at a proper measure of
lamages.
91. Id. at 164, T.L.R. at 180.
92. Id. at 162, T.L.R. at 179.
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(1) While the quantum of life expectancy of the victim is rele-
vant, and the extent to which his life span was shortened by the defend-
ant's wrongful act, the right conclusion cannot be reached by statistical
or actuarial tests alone because . . "in any case the thing to be
valued is not the prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a
predominantly happy life."
The Lord Chancellor declared:
It would be fallacious to assume, for this purpose, that all
human life is continuously an enjoyable thing, so that the shorten-
ing of it calls for compensation to be paid to the deceased's estate
on a quantitative basis. The ups and downs of life, its pains and
sorrows as well as its joys and pleasures-all that makes up "Life's
fitful fever"-have to be allowed for in the estimate. In assessing
damages for shortening of life, therefore, such damages should
not be calculated solely or even mainly on the basis of the length
of life that is lost.93
(2) The problem is to fix a reasonable figure to be paid by way
of damages for the loss of a measure of prospective happiness and this
is to be determined from the circumstances of the victim's life rather
than by any presumption "that human life is, on the whole, good."
Lord Simon was not inclined to accept the presumption acted
upon in some of the earlier decisions "that human life is, on the whole,
good." He thought that the trial court should be satisfied ". . . that
the circumstances of the individual life were calculated to lead, on
balance, to a positive measure of happiness, of which the victim has
been deprived by the defendant's negligence." In this connection one
would be entitled to consider whether the character or habits of the
individual were calculated to lead him to a future of unhappiness or
despondency, or to an opposite state of existence, taking into account
every species of relevant evidence. Thus it would be pertinent to know
that prior to the accident an independent injury or disease had already
put a mortgage on the victim's life expectancy by shortening his
expectable existence and producing a continuing state of pain and
suffering or impaired happiness."'
93. Id. at 166, T.L.R. at 180.
94. Ibid. Defendant's counsel is entitled to show that pre-existing disease or in-
jury had already shortened plaintiff's life expectancy. Adams v. Kaiser, 285 Pac.
751 (Cal. 1930) (Sustaining P's objection to questions asked by defendant of its
medical witness to determine whether prior ailment, or the automobile accident in
litigation shortened P's life, held reversible error). Defendant is also entitled to
show that such expectancy should be discounted because decedent was in a hazardous
occupation. The Oropesa, [1942] P. 140, 58 T.L.R. 328. Or was on the verge of
being called into military service in times of war, with all the attendant perils of
premature death. Hall v. Wilson, 56 T.L.R. 15 (K.B. 1939), 4 All. E.R. 85.
Mortality tables are only prima facie evidence of the expectation of life of a par-
ticular person, and evidence of conditions tending to decrease the expectation of life
of such person is admissible. Townsend v. Briggs, 99 Cal. 481, 34 Pac. 116 (1893).
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(3) In appraising the victim's prospects of future Happiness, an
objective estimate is to be made by the trier of fact; the test is not
subjective, as the victim may have miscalculated what lay ahead of
him. 5
This view goes hand in hand with the conception that shortening
of life expectancy involves an absolute loss not dependent upon produc-
tion of mental anguish in the victim. One must stand off, as it were,
and look at the victim's prospective life as an impartial appraiser of
assets and liabilities, doing so with a detachment and insight which
the victim himself may not have possessed at the time of the accident.
The victim may have mistaken a temporary illness or loss of happiness
for a permanent state, and an objective appraisal by an informed
observer is needed to detect such errors or distortions in the psychic
prognosis.
(4) The appraisal is to be confined to the loss of expectation of
life without including loss of pecuniary prospects resulting from the
same injury
2 6
The objective here is to distinguish psychic and economic injuries
which may result from the shortening of a person's life expectancy.
This is desirable analytically.
(5) Smaller damages should be awarded in the case of a very
young child for the reason that "there is necessarily so much uncer-
tainty about the child's future that no confident estimate of prospec-
tive happiness can be made."
The position here is that while the fact of injury legitimately may
be assumed, the degree of it is more speculative than where the victim
is an adult whose prospects in life are more clearly established. The
plaintiff will naturally try to reduce these uncertainties by such evi-
dence as that brought forward in the Benham case showing that the
child was a normal healthy infant, living in a country village off the
main road where the risks of accident and of contagious disease were
less than in crowded centers, and that he was living in a modest but
happy home presided over by a father who had been continuously em-
ployed for fifteen years.
(6) The proper sum to be awarded should not be influenced by
the social or economic position of the victim.
The view here is that the poor man's psyche is as precious as the
rich man's and that happiness is not a product of wordly wealth. Lord
95. Benbam v. Gambling, op. cit. supra, note 89 at 167, T.L.R. at 180.
96. Ibid.
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Simon puts it this way: "Lawyers and judges may here join hands
with moralists and philosophers and declare that the degree of hap-
piness to be attained by a human being does not depend on wealth or
status." ' Such a philosophy is thoroughly democratic and few will
dissent from the major premise. It does appear, however, that evi-
dence of economic status should be admissible for the limited purpose
of showing whether the victim had enough to provide himself with
simple creature comforts, as this inquiry seems relevant to the issue
of probable future happiness. But this inquiry must not be pursued
too far, because materialists tend to confuse wealth and happiness. It
should be enough for the plaintiff to show that the victim had means of
reasonable subsistence, while the defendant should be restricted to
counter-evidence that the victim was living in a state of miserable
penury.
(7) Shortening of life expectancy should be modestly compen-
sated because of the difficulties of proof and the lack of a definite stand-
ard for measuring the loss.
Lord Simon makes it clear that he intends his opinion to counter-
act any tendency to allow inflationary damages for shortening of life
expectancy.98  We saw in Rose v. Ford that £1,000 was considered
to be a reasonable award for shortening the life expectancy of a twenty-
three year old girl by a fatal injury. But there no real dispute existed
as to the proper measure of damages, and one can only conjecture
whether the House of Lords, after its decision in the Benham case,
would now consider such a figure reasonable or excessive.
Special Problems. Consider the comment of Lord Wright, in
Rose v. Ford that "Special cases may occur, such as that of an infant,
97. Ibid.
98. Id. at 168, T.L.R. at 181. Lord Chancellor Simon said: "The truth, of course,
is that in putting a money value on the prospective balance of happiness in years that
the deceased might otherwise have lived, the jury or judge of fact is attempting to
equate incommensurables. Damages which wotdd be proper for a disabling injury
may well be greater than for deprivation of life. These considerations lead me to the
conclusion that in assessing damages under this head, whether in the case of a child
or an adult, very moderate figures should be chosen. My noble and learned friend
Lord Roche was well advised when he pointed out in Ford v. Rose the danger
that this head of claim might become unduly prominent and lead to inflation of dam-
ages in cases which do not really justify a large award." (Emphasis added).
The italicized passage seems to us to be demonstrably true. Members of the
Court in the Scottish case of M'Master v. Caledonian Ry. Co., 13 Sess. Cas. 252
(1885), were inclined, in testing the reasonableness of damages, to assume that the
estate of a man who dies of injuries wrongfully inflicted should get no less than
would the man himself had he lived. But this overlooks the fact that death cuts
short many items of continuing damage such as medical and nursing expense, pain
and suffering, mental anguish and prospective complications which might be of an
abhorrent or distressing character. Injuries to the brain or spinal cord may leave
an individual so disabled that constant nursing attendance will be required and this
head of damage, alone, can reach into large sums.
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or an imbecile, or an incurable invalid, or a person involved in hopeless
difficulties." Unusual cases of this sort must be solved by determining
whether the wrongful shortening of the victim's life expectancy entails
a lesser injury, or none at all. It appears that the psychic interest in
continuation of one's life clearly depends, in the last analysis, upon the
subjective attitude of the victim, even though this is to be appraised
objectively. It seems, furthermore, that one must consider whether
the continuation of his life had any meaning and value to the victim
prior to his injury. Consider, for instance, the fact that most people
afflicted with incurable cancer, or crippled by gross disabilities, never-
theless have a will to live life out in full despite any attendant pain or
inconvenience. So long as such a desire to live is present, the pains
or disadvantages of existence cannot defeat the right to damages for
further wrongful shortening of the victim's life, although the pre-
existing impairment of his psychic expectancy would normally require
a lower measure of damages. American courts have recognized the
right of the mentally subnormal person to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries. 9  Such individuals have interests of personality not
dependent upon their economic productivity and any deficiency in their
powers to experience the raptures and joys of life could do no more
than diminish the damages recoverable for wrongful shortening of
their life expectancy. Interesting cases might arise where immediately
before receipt of an injury which shortened his life, the victim had
evinced an unmistakable purpose of committing suicide. Suppose, for
instance, a hypothetical case such as the following. X takes an over-
dose of Nembutal with suicidal intent. Actually the amount of the
drug he ingests is not sufficient to kill or seriously injure him. He
does become stuporous, however, and while sitting on a curb, is struck
by defendant's negligently operated car and gravely injured. Let us
indulge two separate assumptions. Assume, first, that the injuries
result in X's death a few hours later. Shall his suicidal effort be held
to show such a complete renunciation of the will to live that no damages
properly can be allowed for destruction of his psychic expectancy?
Secondly, assume that the injuries sustained are not fatal but reduce
the victim's life expectancy from thirty to five years; furthermore, that
when X becomes conscious he relents his suicidal attempt and now
desires to live. The scientific approach here would be to determine
whether the victim's extinguished will to live and suicidal attempt
proceeded from a temporary depression or psychosis from which he
might be expected to recover shortly, or whether it was an expression
99. See notes 71-74 supra.
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of a permanent pathological condition likely to blot out the prospects
of future happiness. Such unusual cases are not apt to arise in large
numbers, and are mentioned only to emphasize the need for objective
evaluation of the victim's long-range prospects of happiness and for
focussing primarily on the psychological rather than the physical
features of his case. An incurable invalid, an individual who is blind,
or otherwise handicapped, or a person carrying a load of heavy burdens,
may be so psychologically adjusted or compensated that he derives
more happiness from life than his normal brethren. A good example
here is the interesting fact situation in the English case of Feay v.
Barnwell,' in which a seventy-three year old blind man was injured
and his seventy-one year old wife killed in a street accident. The evi-
dence showed that she lived for three weeks after the accident, being
conscious until the last day and suffering great pain. Her husband
had been completely blind for fifteen or seventeen years. She had
enjoyed good health, had done all the work about the house, including
the washing, and had looked after her husband with the greatest care
and devotion. A callous person might assume that so heavy a burden
would be incompatible with any real happiness on the part of the vic-
tim. Singleton, J. correctly perceived the psychological gratification
involved in such a service of love, saying: "Any one who has to deal
with a matter of this sort must feel that part of the wife's joy in life
was in looking after her husband." He assessed £600 as proper dam-
ages to compensate the pain and suffering experienced by the seventy-
one year old wife prior to her death, and the shortening of her life
expectancy by a period of five years. 101
The fact that one wrongfully injured dies before the date of the
trial does not convert the action by his administrator under a survival
act into a wrongful death action, as we have stressed repeatedly. The
death is relevant only as an evidentiary fact in determining the ex-
tent of the loss, for it obviates the necessity of offering medical testi-
mony that the injury shortened the victim's life by an estimated
amount of time.
But a real problem of proof is presented when the victim is
alive at the time of trial but claims that injuries have cut short his
life expectancy. Part of the difficulty here arises from undertaking to
make a medical prophecy that acceleration of death is reasonably cer-
100. [1938] 1 All. E.R. 31 (K.B.).
101. Sometimes British courts isolate the factor of shortening of life expectancy
in assessing damages and sometimes they bracket it with other psychic injuries like
pain and suffering, as the Court did here. On the whole, segregation of all dis-
tinguishable items of damages is desirable scientifically.
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tain to occur after an intervening period of time. The longer the
time interval between cause and predicted effect, the more speculative
is the medical prognostication likely to be. The degree to which par-
ticular injuries or their complications are calculated to shorten life
expectancy are problems which need continuing, systematic medical
study.
102
Expert opinion that injury or disease has shortened a person's
life expectancy is of course admissible in evidence, and a few principles
may be suggested for evaluating such testimony. First, the clinical
course of a person seriously injured should reveal in days, weeks or
months whether the outcome is to be early death or prolonged life with
health restored or impaired.103 The risks of immediate death or of
early complications will therefore normally be tested by passage of
time before an action for damages can be brought to trial.
During this time interval many cases will reach a clinical end
result so that the final deficit in health or activity can be assessed.
A great deal of damage may be sustained by a person in the way of
anatomic loss without any predictable shortening of his previous life
span. A good example is the loss of an arm or a leg. Any traumatic
injury of this sort may involve risks of death from shock, blood loss
or infection, but if the end result is a limited anatomic or functional
loss without impairment of general health, one must view with skep-
ticism any prediction that the injury is reasonably certain to reduce
the victim's life expectancy.
10 4
102. The average risk varies from .01% in cases of simple concussion of the
brain to as high as 20-40% following depressed fractures of the skull with laceration
of the meninges and underlying brain. The cause seems to be the formation of scar
tissue which contracts with age and by exerting traction on the brain, sets up a focus
of irritation. But one cannot procure statistics on how much traumatic epilepsy,
once it has materialized, tends to shorten life expectancy on the average; indeed,
this cannot be discovered either from the largest insurance companies or the leading
Neurological Institutes. The matter has not yet been adverted to as a subject of
study, in this regard being like countless other important medicolegal problems.
103. This is called by physicians, attainment of the "end result" or period of
consolidation. Death or cure have occurred or full convalescence with a station-
ary deficit or impairment. "This is the time when complete physiological adjustment
has taken place, when the maximum repair is completed and the resulting conditions
are truly fixed or permanent." Kessler, General Principles of Evaluating Disability,
19 TENN. L. REv. 282, (1946).
104. Account must always be taken, also, of the remarkable, continuing advances
in Rehabilitation Medicine. See KESSLER, PRNcIPLEs AND PRACTICES oF REHABILrrA-
TION, (1950).
Rehabilitation Medicine spans both physical and psychic disabilities, surgical and
non-surgical techniques, the use of physiotherapy and other forms of Physical Medi-
cine. While our Courts are slow to hold that the injured person has a duty to
submit to major corrective surgery as a means of minimizing his injuries and dis-
abilities, Ludlam, Plaintiff's Duty to Minimize Defendant's Liability by Surgery,
17 TENN. L. REv. 821, (1943) ; we may hope that in future the test of reasonableness
will become whether the procedure is usual treatment customarily prescribed by
surgeons and generally accepted by patients who have no medicolegal claim pend-
ing.
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The foundation is better for a medical opinion that the victim's
injuries are reasonably certain to shorten life expectancy when those
injuries permanently impair general health. These include injuries
which disrupt normal functioning of one or more vital organ systems,
and those which reduce the victim to a state of continuing invalidism.
Coronary occlusion caused by an actionable psychic or physical trauma,
may not be fatal, yet leave the surviving victim with a much im-
paired cardiac reserve and a warrantable prognosis of shortened
life."0 5 Severe multiple injuries may produce similar effects, reducing
the victim's resistance to disease while simultaneously opening up
risks of late complications or sequellae. Injuries to the central nervous
system involving, for instance, partial or complete severance of the
spinal cord, or gross damage to the brain, may result in varying de-
grees of paralysis, loss of control of the bladder, and other effects
naturally calculated to shorten the victim's life expectancy.0 6 Roach
v. Yates 1'7 was a case of this sort. The evidence there showed that
a thirty-three year old bricklayer was riding a bicycle to work when
a car negligently operated by the defendant struck him. He sustained
head injuries which produced traumatic dementia with gross altera-
tion of mental functions, traumatic epilepsy with seizures occurring
once a week, incontinence of urine and feces and other consequences
which made him a helpless invalid, incapable of looking after himself
and dependent day and night upon the care of a nurse. Attending
physicians testified that the injuries had shortened plaintiff's life from
thirty to sixteen years, an estimate so fair that one might well point to
it as an admirable model of conservative medical prognosis in apprais-
ing such a case.
An injury may be such that the victim is able to attain to normal
life and good health once more but with some permanent depletion
of a vital function which statistics show will entail some shortening of
life expectancy. Here we are thinking of the man who sustains the
loss of one kidney, or one lung or the like, as the result of an injury.
One is impressed by the way in which nature has provided consider-
able reserve capacity in respect to carrying out vital functions, par-
ticularly striking where two anatomical units such as the kidneys or
105. Estabrook v. Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., 163 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1947) (Evi-
dence showed that coronary occlusion traumatically induced had decreased victim's
life expectancy from 27.45 years to 10 years and that any physical strain would cause
pain).
106. The state of helplessness, impaired functioning and inactivity tend to cause
muscle atrophy, bed sores, secondary infections and complications and the lowered
physical and psychic resistance of the patient increase these hazards.
107. [1938] 1 K.B. 256 (A.C.).
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lungs serve the same purpose. So bountiful is this reserve that an
individual may carry out vital functions and live to a ripe age after
losing one of these paired organs.:'0 Any such loss, however, does
increase the statistical risk of earlier death for the members of such a
class, and it would seem proper, therefore, to allow some damages for
shortening of life expectancy to a plaintiff who has been so injured.
Courts may gain some help from the foregoing considerations in
determining the credibility of a medical opinion that a particular injury
has shortened the life expectancy of the victim. Any final doubts con-
cerning the accuracy of the medical prognostication may serve as a
proper ground for holding damages to modest levels.
Avoidance of Double Damages. The main possibility of double
damages for the same loss arises from the fact that fatal injuries may re-
sult in two actions: one a suit under a survival statute wherein dece-
dent's administrator enforces the victim's cause of action; the other an
action under a wrongful death act to recover the "pecuniary loss"
suffered by named beneficiaries.0 9 In Britain, the two actions are
108. "A person can get along if he retains good function in one-half of one lung,
one-third of a kidney, one-fourth of the liver, one-tenth of the pancreas, or one-third
of the thyroid gland. Life is possible with only one-half of the total blood volume
and with twenty percent hemoglobin. Among these safety factors are to be included
the large number of digestive ferments and the ability to substitute one foodstuff
for another. The potential of muscular effort is far greater than the usual work
performed. One structure may substitute for another, as does the skin for the kidney
in the elimination of wastes. [Continuation of the blood vessels adjacent to the
injured ones.] Through these and similar vicarious functions, biologic adaptation
achieved. The body is like an iceberg, revealing only about one-fifth of its great
strength, while submerged, ready for any emergency, lies four-fifths of its great
powers." Kessler, General Principles of Evahuting Disability, 19 TENN. L. Rav.
282, 289 (1946).
109. It is this fact that has produced such a contrariety of approaches and com-
plex confusion in our American States having both types of statute. Some juris-
dictions hold that the two remedies are concurrent, and complementary measures of
damages are worked out to avoid duplications. Under this view, as in Britain, there
are two separate and maintainable causes of action, which may be tried separately,
or if the administrator is the same, consolidated. Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d
96 (1st Cir. 1940); McCarthy v. Wood Lumber Co., 219 Mass. 566, 107 N.E. 439
(1914) ; Hindmarsh v. Sulpho-Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806 (1922).
Other jurisdictions, unfortunately, hold that the remedy provided by the wrongful
death statute is exclusive. This has the undesirable effect of forgiving a part of the
wrongdoer's proper liability. Some courts distinguish cases where the victim has
begun suit during his lifetime, holding that his administrator can revive it under a
survival statute, though he might not be able to institute an original action in behalf
of the estate after the victim's demise, if, in that state, the wrongful death act is
held to be exclusive. (7 ALR 1355; 26 A.L.R. 593) But this distinction hardly
seems tenable.
Still other Courts hold that where death is instantaneous, recovery can be had
only under a wrongful death statute. Kyes v. Valley Telephone Co. 132 Mich. 281,
93 N.W. 623 (1903). This whole line of authority is mistaken, for it assumes that
there was not time for a cause of action to accrue to the victim. But this is a
specious assumption for in science there is no possibility of the traumatic impact and
resultant death occurring simultaneously: there is always a necessary time interval
between cause and effect and this permits the right of action to vest in the person
injured.
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usually joined, thus eliminating supposed risks of overlapping damages.
If they are brought separately, the matter is taken care of by proper
charge to the jury."' Actually, the current British practice of offsetting
the recovery under the wrongful death act against damages for shorten-
ing of life expectancy, and vice versa, where the plaintiff is the same in
the two actions, seems to involve a mistaken notion. The vice of
double damages exists only where the defendant is made to pay com-
pensation twice for the same injury. "Pecuniary loss" under the
wrongful death statute does not include the loss of psychic expectancy,
nor does the latter embrace any factor of lost earnings, as the British
courts now clearly recognize. They are separate and distinct injuries
flowing from the wrongful shortening of the victim's life. The risk
of double damages arises only where the administrator under the sur-
vival statute can recover damages for impairment of decedent's earn-
ing capacity as well as for the psychic injury resulting from wrongful
shortening of his life expectancy. In that case, proper safeguards
must be taken to see that the beneficiaries under a wrongful death
act will have their claim for "pecuniary loss" satisfied without sub-
jecting the defendant to risks of double damages. American courts
have reacted to this vexatious problem in a variety of ways; the per-
fect solution seems to call for model legislation. A general survival
statute could be enacted providing for preservation of the decedent's
full cause of action while yet setting aside a specified portion of the
recovery for the benefit of decedent's dependents, free of the claim of
creditors. We have seen that the cause of action which vests in an
110. Where damages for loss of life expectancy were assessed at £300, but on
intestacy, the widow was entitled to the whole of it, this would merge in the sum of
£1500 awarded to her under the Fatal Accidents Act, and not be recoverable in
addition. Feay v. Barnwell, [1938] 1 All. E.R. 31 (K.B.). This principle of offset
has been applied consistently in recent British cases: The Aizkarai Mendi, [19381
P. 263, 3 All. E.R. 483; Hall v. Wilson, 56 T.L.R. 15 (K.B. 1939), 4 All. E.R. 85;
May v. McAlpine & Sons, Ltd., 54 T.L.R. 850 (K.B. 1938), 3 All. E.R. 85.
It has been held, further, that pensions received by the widow and children of a
policeman, both from statutory and voluntary funds, would need be deducted in
assessing damages for shortening of his life under the Law Reform Act of 1934 (by
being killed at age 35 while in perfect health), and under the Fatal Accidents Act.
The Court took the position that these funds were not in the nature of insurance
moneys (which of course are not deductible from defendant's damages.) Lory v.
Great Western Ry. Co., [1942] 1 All. E.R. (K.B.) 230.
In The Oropesa, [1942] P. 140, 58 T.L.R. 328, deceased was drowned in a
rescue operation at sea. The same parties at interest sued both for loss of deceased's
expectation of life under the Law Reform Act (Survival Statute) of 1934 and for
pecuniary loss suffered as part dependents under the Fatal Accidents Act. The ao-
peal court affirmed awards of £200 for the shortening of life and £50 under the Fatal
Accidents Act.
The obvious intent of consolidating actions and offsetting awards is to prevent
duplication of damages under the Act of 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act as directed
by Lord Wright in Rose v. Ford.
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injured man, however quickly he may die, actually includes every
item of damage for which the defendant can be made to pay compen-
sation. If one shares our view that the whole cause of action should
be preserved, it is clear that Lord Campbell's Act, enacted by Parlia-
ment in 1846 and widely copied in this country, is an inadequate,
piecemeal reform of the common law rule that death of tortfeasor or
victim extinguishes a tort claim. That Act did no more than confer
upon dependents of one wrongfully killed a right of action for their
resultant "pecuniary loss." This does not even preserve in all cases
the right to recover the absolute loss of earnings which results from
destruction of the victim's earning capacity. A single survival statute
designed to preserve the whole cause of action, or to limit the amount
of recovery in respect to any or all items of damage, could provide
directions for distribution of proceeds between dependents, creditors
and other claimants and eliminate altogether the need for any separate
wrongful death act. Inviting such innovation is the rule already fol-
lowed in many American jurisdictions that an administrator suing
under a general survival statute can enforce the victim's full cause
of action. This is held to include the right to damages for destruc-
tion of the victim's future earning capacity by the wrongful shortening
of his life.11 The complexities created by interplay of survival statutes
and wrongful death acts are, of course, quite collateral to the policy
problems involved in determining whether damages should be granted
or denied for the psychic injury involved in wrongful shortening of the
plaintiff's life expectancy."'
PENULTIMATE REFLECTIONS AND PROPOSALS
For purposes of assessing damages for personal injuries, interests
of personality should be thought of as a spectrum, both broad and
long, coextensive with life, divisible into two main bundles or bands:
economic interests and psychic values. These contain assets prin-
111. Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 A. 987 (1913); Kyes v. Valley Tel. Co.,
132 Mich. 281, 93 N.W. 623 (1903); Imbriana v. Anderson, 76 N.H. 491, 84 A.
974 (1912). See also, Maher v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 181 Pa. 391 (1897);
Vicksburg & M.R. Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693, 2 So. 537 (1887); Hindmarsh v.
Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806 (1922); Murray v. Omaha
Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175 (1914), affd on relwaring, 98 Neb. 482 (1915); West
v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 81 N.H. 522, 129 A. 768 (1925) ; Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia,
3"44 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942); Parker v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P.2d
425 (1941) ; Rogers v. Lurye Furn. Co., 193 Wis. 496, 211 N.W. 782 (1927).
112. These run to administration of the remedy and prevention of double damages
rather than to negation of the right to sue for injurious invasions of the interest
which one should be legally recognized as having in the continuation of his own life.
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cipally, but oftentimes the asset is a net balance after deducting inter-
related liabilities. We may chart these relations thus:
A A It a,Bir- h 13 111C D




4. Normal physiological and psychic functioning
5. Psychic values
6. Economic interests; power to earn money by personal functioning
7. Economic productivity impaired or destroyed by injury
8. Psychic values and economic interests cut off prematurely: absolute loss of assets
a. Pain and suffering from traumatic injury or stimulus
b. Mental anguish caused by injury or stimulus
c. Fears, anxieties, neurosis, psychosis
d. Impairment or loss of social amenities due to injury
e. Impairment or loss of anatomical structures or body tissue due to injury
f. Impairment or loss of physiologic or psychic function due to injury
The reader is invited to consider the effects of a serious personal
injury on these interests: Pain and suffering; mental anguish; fears,
anxieties, neuroses and psychoses may lessen or destroy mental tran-
quillity. Enjoyable amenities ranging from ability to perform countless
habitual acts in taking care of oneself, to pleasurable pursuits, and
aesthetic expression through gratifying creative arts or accomplish-
ments may now be diminished or destroyed. A personality deficit may
be sustained through impairment or destruction of anatomical organs or
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body tissues, or of physiological or psychic functions; this may, and
usually does, result in variable shrinkage of accustomed health, vigor
and personal expression. Obviously life is much damped down be-
tween B and C by these psychic effects. Assuming the fact and causa-
tion of the injuries to be clear, the defendant, if otherwise at fault,
cannot escape liability on the theory that the damages are too uncer-
tain. The law prefers accepting the conscience of the community
(the jury) as a measure of damages to forfeiting the remedy of the
innocent victim."31
Economic interests of the victim suffer, too, as a result of any
partial or total disability to work, and from depletion of his resources
in obtaining care and treatment. The method of assessing damages to
compensate these losses is more certain; yet even this is somewhat
illusory since the final liability of the tortfeasor is notoriously specula-
tive, depending as it does upon the accidental circumstance of the
victim's capacity to earn money. On the other hand, juries tend in
compensating psychic injuries to treat rich man, poor man, beggar
and thief more nearly alike.
Probably it is wholesome, in a democracy, to employ these op-
posite bases of compensation in tort cases: an individualistic measure-
ment of economic loss to encourage and protect enterprise and initia-
tive, and a social measurement of psychic injury to assure a minimum
compensation of seriously injured human beings whatever may be
their social or financial status.
Bearing in mind that the law traditionally grants damages for
tragiment disturbances of psychic security consequent upon physical
injury, and the ever-widening protection given to the psyche as our
law evolves," 4 it is difficult to see why wrongful shortening of the
113. "Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment
of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the
wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages
may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence
shows the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although
the result may be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that
the damages cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would be
possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise!'
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1930).
This philosophy is applied frequently in supporting jury discretion in determin-
ing appropriate damages for non-mathematical consequences of personal injuries.
See Avance v. Thompson, 320 Ill. App. 406, 51 N.E.2d 334 (1943) (Plaintiff sus-
tained loss of two legs below knees; much pain and suffering; 13 weeks in hospital
where a further amputation was required; $125,000. verdict reduced to $100,000 by
reinittitur). The Appellate Court said: "It is difficult to appraise scientifically human
pain and suffering and a mutilated body. In this character of case, the damages are
for the determination of the jury, and unless we are able to say that the jury was
moved by prejudice and passion, we would not be warranted in reversing the judg-
ment on the ground that the verdict is excessive."
114. Witness the rapid evolution of the legal protection against injuries from
psychic stimuli, Smith, Legal Liability for Psychic Stimui, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193
(1944). Note the expanding recognition of the right of privacy, nine additional
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personality spectrum should not be compensated as involving a per-
manent impairment of psychic interests. The premature death of the
victim at point C of our diagram entails an absolute loss of personality
assets or resources, psychic and economic.
It seems reasonable that the prospective loss of all modalities of
personality expression, reasonably certain to occur through premature
death of the victim, is of more serious import than the mere temporary
invasion of psychic tranquillity such as are involved in pain and
suffering, mental anguish and the like. And as a practical matter, the
need for scientific development of the law of damages argues as
strongly for recognition of wrongful shortening of life expectancy as
an independent head of damage. We have seen that this predicted
consequence is admissible in evidence to prove mental anguish or the
seriousness of the injury. Once in, such evidence becomes one of
those indeterminate factors which operate sub rosa, to inflate awards
unpredictably. By recognizing wrongful shortening of life expectancy
as a separate element of damages, a covertly compensated factor may
be catalogued and subjected to judicial control in respect to the in-
adequacy or excessiveness of damages actually being allowed for it.
It has been assumed in most quarters that the wrongful shorten-
ing of life expectancy was first recognized as a legal wrong by the
English courts in 1935 in the celebrated case of Flint v. Lovell. Yet,
as seen, the principle was enunciated in earlier English, Scottish and
Empire cases. Apparently it has not previously been noticed that
this species of legal injury was first recognized in America in the
case of Murphy v. New York and New Haven R. R. Co." 5  It is
difficult to say how frequently lawyers are utilizing wrongful shorten-
ing of plaintiff's life expectancy to enhance damages. We have seen
that unwarranted resort to common law rules concerning the jural
effects of death has led some of our courts into erroneously excluding
this proper item of damages from compensation. Some of our appeal
courts allude freely to evidence that plaintiff's injuries will shorten his
life as a means of underlining their serious import and the consequent
reasonableness of damages assessed by the jury."16
states having embraced the doctrine between 1936 and 1948. Feinberg, Recent De-
velopments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COL. L. Ray. 713, 1948. For a perceptible
start toward renunciation of the anachronistic tort doctrine that the unborn, but viable
child, has no interests of personality, see Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.
87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949) : "An unborn, viable child is a 'person' within the mean-
ing of the constitutional guarantee of redress to every person for injury done him."
Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (The estate of a viable child
who is born dead, may sue the wrongdoer whose conduct caused the fatal injury, for
damages under a Wrongful Death Statute).
115. 30 Conn. 184 (1861).
116. Cases cited in notes 48-50 siopra. See also: Estabrook v. Butte, H. & P. Ry.
Co., 163 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1947) Fournier v. Zinn, 257 Mass. 575, 154 N.E. 268
(1926) ; Cooper v. St. Paul City R. Co., 54 Minn. 379; 56 N.W. 42 (1893) ; Magee
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If Flint v. Lovell was not the first case to proclaim the right of
man to have legal redress for wrongful shortening of his life expectancy,
it quickly became one of the celebrated causes of modern times among
the common people of England. 17 The case was taken up with
alacrity by counsel for injured plaintiffs and speedily became a tradi-
tional ground of damage. It was but natural that the Court should
have held in Ford v. Rose that the cause of action is saved by a sur-
vival act for the benefit of victim's estate when he dies before suit."'
In what respects, then, should leave be taken of English practice in
administering the remedy?
The right to recover damages for wrongful shortening of life
expectancy should reflect simultaneously the presumed instinct of self-
preservation, or will to live, and the equal value this has in a demo-
cratic society for poor and rich, without reference to class, creed, or
color. An arbitrary ceiling should be put upon the interest, ranging,
say, from $5,000 in case of a person over 45 years of age up to as
much as $10,000 in case of victims who were children at the time of
injury. The number of years by which normal life expectancy has
been reduced should be reflected in the amount of the award, not ig-
nored as the English courts direct."' This follows from the fact
that we are dealing with an absolute loss of an asset-life substance.
Children, therefore, should be held entitled to larger damages for their
greater deprivation of life substance. This would help equalize the
hardship resulting from hesitation of some courts to compensate loss
of future earnings liberally because of doubts as to what economic
future the child would have had in absence of his disabling injuries. 2 0
The justice in varying compensation according to the years of life
lost is buttressed by another consideration. The wrongdoer is liable
in damages for future pain and suffering and mental anguish reason-
ably certain to result from the injuries. As the date of the victim's
death is accelerated, the award for these factors diminishes, for the
reason that life expectancy of the victim followingq the injury is used
v. City of Troy, 48 Hun. 383, 1 N.Y.S. 24 (1888); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo
Inc., 144 Neb. 394 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944) (4 year old boy struck by truck; so in-
jured that doctors declared his life expectancy had been reduced 25 years; verdict
and judgment for $20,000. affirmed).
117. It is said to have become almost household knowledge; a new right of the
common man which only legislation could now nullify.
118. Because it can vest in the victim, death never being instantaneous, and be-
cause a survival act is enacted expressly to perpetuate the right of redress. Clark v.
Manchester, 62 N.H. 577 (1883) Allen, J.: "Practically and in substance, though the
intervening time may be very brief, an injury causing death or resulting in death
must precede death in point of time."
119. Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157, 57 T.L.R. 177.
120. Minors who have been permanently disabled or impaired by personal injuries
are entitled to have their economic future estimated but this process usually induces
an ultra-conservative judicial approach in fixing limits of reasonable compensation for
serious personal injuries sustained by immature children.
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to measure the period during which he will continue to suffer per-
manent pain. 2 - But as this type of injury to the victim is progressively
reduced by increased acceleration of death, the absolute loss of life
substance is correspondingly increased thereby.
Some may object to the development of arbitrary limits of com-
pensation by the judiciary. But this seems not only plausible, but per-
missible and desirable. The chief risk in compensating psychic injury
arises from the. possibility that jurors will make irreconcilable awards
in similar cases or seize upon the item as a run-away factor in returning
excessive verdicts. Only trial judges and appeal courts can discharge
the important function of maintaining comparable awards in similar
cases and regularizing damages through exercise of their discretionary
power to require remittiturs or to order new trials. There is nothing
novel or radical in suggesting that such judges may properly fix limits
of compensation for real injuries not scientifically measurable in a
dollar figure. This would open the door to compensation of serious
psychic injuries objectively demonstrable while closing it against the
risks of speculative and fantastic awards prompted by purely subjec-
tive or visceral reactions.
It is reasonable to start with a presumption that the instinct for
self-preservation is operative so that plaintiff's life is a good thing to
him, worth living to the full of nature's gift, and compensable on the
theory that his psychic interest in this regard is as valuable as any
other man's. Thus a prima facie norm of compensation exists which
varies only with the amount of time cut off by the injury from the
victim's pre-existing life expectancy. 2 ' The burden of going forward
with evidence indicating that plaintiff's interest in life was previously
impaired or gone, or that his life expectancy had already been cur-
tailed by pre-existing injury or disease should rest upon defendant.
Lastly, it should be clear that as the economic and psychic re-
siiltants of physical injuries are separate and distinct heads of com-
pensation, the English courts are in error in assuming that the award
for one must be set off against the other as a means of preventing
double damages.
CONCLUSION
We have endeavored to show that the shortening of a person's
life expectancy by wrongful conduct involves an actionable invasion of
a right of personality which modern law should recognize and redress.
121. Whereas life expectancy immediately prior to the injury is used to estimate
loss of future earnings. Webb v. Omaha & S.I. Ry. Co., 101 Neb. 596, 164 N.W. 564
(1917).
122. The item to be compensated thus becomes more objective, and less meta-
physical. It might even be valued by stipulation of counsel in non-controversial cases.
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The right of action accrues at the moment of the wrongful impact and
survives to the victim's administrator where the common law bar to
transmissibility of tort claims has been lifted by a survival statute.
Whether such an interest of personality should be recognized and vin-
dicated involves a fresh problem to be solved in the light of current
legal and social policy and is not controlled by the anomalous common
law rules dealing with the juridical effects attached to death of the
victim or'wrongdoer. Present day conceptions of the meaning and
value of human personality call for this additional protection of the
psychic interest one has in continuation of a life which to him is worth
living. The difficulties of administering the remedy should be no
ground for withholding recognition of the right and refusing redress
for its wrongful impairment. Better, it would be, to recognize the
right to damages for wrongful shortening of life expectancy and to
forestall risks of inflationary awards by restricting the measure of
damages. In that direction lies the proper course of legal evolution.
